When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An Affirmative Defense for Battered Mothers by Brown, Geneva
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 1 Article 8
2005
When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An
Affirmative Defense for Battered Mothers
Geneva Brown
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Brown, Geneva (2005) "When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An Affirmative Defense for Battered Mothers," William
Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 32: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/8
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005 9:54:01 AM 
 
189 
WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS—
AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE FOR BATTERED MOTHERS 
Geneva Brown† 
  
 I. INTRODUCTION...................................................................... 190 
 II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTERED WOMEN ............................. 197 
 III. SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN ................................. 203 
 IV. THE FOUNDATION OF TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS ....................... 211 
 A. Traumatic Bonding .......................................................... 211 
 B. Duress Defense .................................................................. 217 
 V. DURESS DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME.......... 221 
 VI. FAILURE TO PROTECT LAWS................................................... 224 
 A. Background ...................................................................... 224 
 B. State v. Sarah Snodie ..................................................... 228 
 C. Legal Standards................................................................ 230 
 1. Objective .....................................................................231 
 2. Strict Liability .............................................................232 
 3. Subjective ....................................................................234 
 D. Practical Application of Subjective Standard....................... 236 
 VII. TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS........................................................... 237 
 A. Background ...................................................................... 237 
 B. Practical Application......................................................... 240 
 VIII. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 241 
 
 
       † Geneva Brown operates a criminal defense firm in Chicago, Illinois.  She 
most recently was a visiting professor at the UNLV Boyd School of Law working in 
the Thomas and Mack Legal Clinic.  She worked for nine years as a Wisconsin 
State Public Defender. She holds degrees from the University of Wisconsin (B.A. 
1988), University of Wisconsin Law School (J.D. 1993), and the University of 
Illinois-Chicago (M.A. 2004).  She thanks the faculty and staff of the Thomas and 
Mack Legal Clinic including: Dr. Ina Dorman, Taurus Duncan, and Arleta Young 
along with her research assistant Kristine Gallagher for their invaluable assistance.  
She also extends a warm thanks to the staff of the Kenosha County Public 
Defender’s Office and Labish Bergovoy. 
1
Brown: When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis—An Affirmative Defense
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:54:01 AM 
190 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:1 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Sarah Snodie is a very violent person and she should receive the 
maximum prison sentence for her crimes. 
Robert Jambois, Kenosha County District Attorney1 
[T]he level of coercion and control Sarah endured in that 
relationship I do think is analogous to being in the concentration 
camp and very much like that where time, money, where you go, 
what you say, what you do, isolating you from other people, all 
those things existed, aside from the face of very tense, prolonged 
and recurrent and severe physical and sexual violence. 
Dr. Kevin Fullin2 
 
Eighteen-year-old Sarah Snodie watched her boyfriend, 
Donnell McKennie, torture and kill her seventeen-month-old son, 
Drake London.  Sarah Snodie explained to the police that 
McKennie struck Drake so many times she lost count.3  McKennie 
also assaulted Sarah twice on the same day.4  An autopsy revealed 
that Drake London died of massive brain injuries.5  Donnell 
McKennie received a forty-five-year sentence after being convicted 
of first-degree reckless homicide, and Sarah Snodie received a ten-
year sentence for felony child neglect.6 
Sarah Snodie became a multifarious symbol of perpetrator and 
victim.  Was she a cold-blooded woman capable of watching her 
live-in boyfriend kill her child?  Or was she a hapless victim of abuse 
who could not intervene to save herself or her child from the abuse 
of Donnell McKennie?  The criminal justice system treated her as 
the former, and Sarah Snodie received a devastating prison 
sentence.  Not only did she witness her child being killed by her 
abuser, the State charged Sarah for failing to save her child’s life.7 
 
 1. Transcript of Sentencing at 5-6, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. Dist. 
Ct. Jan. 21, 1997). 
 2. Id. at 29-30. 
 3. Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 21, 1997). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 7. 
 6. Judgment of Conviction, Snodie, No. 97CF0046; Judgment of Conviction, 
McKennie, No. 97CF0047. 
 7. David Cole, Defense Lawyer Wants Gag Order on Abuse Case, MILWAUKEE J. 
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A battered mother who unsuccessfully attempts to protect 
herself and her children against an abuser does not fit within any 
model that would garner sympathy from any court or jury.8  When 
the abuser kills the woman’s child, the law treats her as an 
accomplice to the murder.9 
The criminal justice system fails to understand the trauma that 
a woman like Sarah Snodie suffered within the relationship with 
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 8. See Odeana R. Neal, Myths and Moms: Images of Women and Termination of 
Parental Rights, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 61 (1995) (“Mothers who decide that 
any aspect of their lives has greater value than, or is co-equal with their concern 
for their children, are the bad [mothers].”). 
 9. See People v. Pollock, 780 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. 2002) (following precedent, 
stating that failing to act on the child’s behalf establishes a mother’s 
accountability, a mechanism by which a conviction may be secured);  see also Kim 
Ahearn et al., The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers 
with “Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (2000) 
(citing reasons why battered mothers fail to seek assistance before a case such as 
Sarah Snodie’s takes place).  The article states: 
We are also concerned that battered mothers will be less likely to seek 
domestic violence intervention if there is an increased risk that they will 
suffer arrest and the loss of their children to foster care.  The Instant 
Response Protocol could lead to these outcomes if there is not clear 
guidance about the role of law enforcement and child protective workers 
in these cases and adequate training of child welfare workers about how 
to work with law enforcement.  The current protocol does not define any 
criteria for when [the child protective agency] should refer a case to the 
police or when the police should refer a case to [the child protective 
agency]. Without a clear standard for when arrest or removal of children 
is appropriate, both police and child protective workers may err on the 
side of removing children rather than the batterer. 
Id. at 856-57.  The “Failure to Protect” Working Group cites the reasons why 
battered mothers fail to seek assistance before a case such as Sarah Snodie’s takes 
place.  Id. at 857-62. 
 10. See Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically 
Abusive Relationships, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 107, 113 (1990) (determining that 99% of 
3
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and McKennie under a psychological rubric would have given the 
court a greater understanding of the trauma Snodie suffered and 
the strategies she used in negotiating survival with a violent 
partner.11  The psychological state of the woman must be 
examined.12 
If the law perceives that a woman failed to protect her child, 
she faces severe civil and criminal penalties.13  Courts terminate the 
parental rights of battered mothers in civil failure to protect cases.14  
Battered mothers are also prosecuted to the fullest extent of the 
law.15  Many women have not only been charged with failure to 
render aid, but are also charged as accomplices to the murder.16  It 
 
battered women surveyed experienced some psychological abuse and 72% 
experienced at least four types of psychological abuse). 
 11. See Susan V. McLeer et al., Education Is Not Enough: A System’s Failure in 
Protecting Battered Women, 18 ANNALS EMERGENCY MED. 651 (1989) (concluding that 
training and establishment of screening protocol of females admitted in a 
hospital’s emergency department identified increased numbers of battered 
women for whom essential care and services could be provided). 
 12. See Follingstad et al., supra note 10, at 116-17. 
 13. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part VI.C. (discussing cases where battered mothers had their 
parental rights terminated). 
 15. One of the first cases to prosecute a mother for the death of her child by 
an abuser was Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960).  The court succinctly stated 
the reasons for appellate review: 
The theory of the state’s case is that the appellant was guilty of gross, or 
criminal, negligence in permitting her paramour to inflict, upon her 
twenty months’ old child, prolonged and brutal beatings that finally 
resulted in the child’s death; and that her said negligence, under the 
circumstances here presented, was a proximate cause of the child’s 
death.  The defense argues that the appellant’s conduct did not measure 
up to gross, or criminal, negligence; and her negligence, if any, was not a 
proximate cause of the death. 
Id. at 468.  The court held: 
In 1 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure (Anderson), Section 68, the 
learned author states: “[i]t is sufficient that the ultimate harm is one 
which a reasonable man would foresee as being reasonably related to the 
acts of the defendant . . . . To constitute the cause of the harm, it is not 
necessary that the defendant’s act be the sole reason for the realization of 
the harm which has been sustained by the victim.  The defendant does 
not cease to be responsible for his otherwise criminal conduct because 
there were other conditions which contributed to the same result.”  The 
appellant easily could, and should, have removed Terry from this danger.  
Her failure to do so, under the circumstances previously described, is 
sufficient, as indicated before, to support a finding by the trial judge that 
her gross and criminal negligence was a contributing cause of Terry’s 
unfortunate death. 
Id. at 474. 
 16. Cf. Corey Kilgannon, For a Notorious Victim, Some Things Never Heal, N.Y. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/8
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:54:01 AM 
2005] WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS 193 
is difficult to craft a defense that gives an adequate response to the 
troubling question of why a woman would allow a man to physically 
abuse, or worse, kill her child.17  The psychological phenomenon of 
traumatic bonding addresses this perplexing question. 
When a battered woman acts against the violence perpetrated 
against her by killing her abuser, affirmative defenses may vindicate 
her violent behavior.18  A battered woman may give testimony and 
have witnesses explain the length and depth of the abuse she 
endured.19  She is also allowed expert testimony to explain the 
mental anguish and trauma she suffered at the hands of her 
abuser.20  The battered mother whose child is killed by her abuser 
faces termination of her parental rights and criminal charges.  She 
needs an affirmative defense and a legal standard that examines 
the nature of her violent relationship and her subjective beliefs.21 
 
TIMES Feb. 10, 2004, at B2, available at 
www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/nyregion/10profile.html  (detailing the 
upcoming release of Joel Steinberg from prison after serving his sentence for the 
murder of the child he raised with his former mate Hedda Nussbaum whom 
Steinberg abused as well).  The charges against Nussbaum for the death were 
eventually dropped after statements by doctors that “years of his beatings had left 
her paralyzed by pain and terror, and too weak to intervene.”  Id. 
 17. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for 
Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579 (1998) 
(arguing for change in failure to protect laws, specifically requesting that courts 
take into account that some mothers are not able to provide requisite protection 
for fear of their own death or serious injury); see also G. Kristian Miccio, A 
Reasonable Battered Mother? Redefining, Reconstructing and Recreating the Battered 
Woman in Child Protective Proceedings, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 89 (1999) (suggesting 
that states may be accomplices to domestic violence due to nonfeasance). 
 18. See Elisabeth Ayyildiz, When Battered Woman’s Syndrome Does Not Go Far 
Enough: The Battered Woman as Vigilante, 4 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 141, 151-52 (1995) 
(suggesting that battered women should be allowed to be seen as vigilantes who 
are acting out against the violence perpetrated against them).  Vigilante should 
have a neutral connotation as in persons who are allowed to keep order and 
punish crime.  Id. 
 19. See Book Note, Generalizing Justice, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1384 (1990) 
(reviewing Lenore E. Walker, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND 
HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS (1989), which discusses a call to reform by a woman that 
has provided expert testimony in more than 150 cases on the effect of repeated 
abuse to a battered woman claiming self-defense). 
 20. Id. at 1384; see, e.g., State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001) (recognizing and applying battered women’s syndrome in MO. REV. STAT. § 
563.033 (1999) which defines the scope of admissible evidence on the issue); State 
v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (Wash. 1984) (joining courts that allow testimony on 
battered women syndrome).  But cf. People v. White, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (Ill. 
1980) (finding expert testimony on the general question of whether “battered 
women tend to remain with their mates” irrelevant). 
 21. See Natalie Loder Clark, Crime Begins at Home: Let’s Stop Punishing Victims 
5
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The purpose of this article is twofold: (1) to establish a 
subjective legal standard in failure to protect cases that addresses 
strategies battered mothers use to protect their children and their 
subjective belief of what protection and intervention means, and 
(2) to allow women like Sarah Snodie the opportunity to explain 
their perceived inaction and be able to defend or mitigate criminal 
charges of omission with a duress defense. 
Parallels can be drawn between self-defense with battered 
woman syndrome as the psychological foundation and the use of 
duress as an affirmative defense with traumatic bonding as the 
psychological foundation.22  Many courts give women who react 
violently against their abusers leeway to explain their trauma.23  
Women who suffer the same trauma but who use unconventional 
strategies to protect themselves and their children should be 
allowed to assert their defense before the court as well.24 
 
and Perpetuating Violence, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 263, 268 (1987) (noting that the 
abused, when emotionally, economically, and physically dependent on the abuser, 
may not recognize the serious nature of domestic abuse). 
 22. See Regina A. Schuller, Expert Evidence and Its Impact on Jurors’ Decisions in 
Homicide Trials Involving Battered Women, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 225, 227 
(2003) (discussing how battered woman syndrome evidence should be presented 
to emphasize the woman’s social reality and context of her life, not just her 
psychological state).  But cf. Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered 
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253 
(1987) (arguing all battered woman syndrome evidence should be kept out of 
court). 
 23. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Self Defense and Relations of Domination: Moral 
and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 477, 507 (1996) (detailing reasons why courts admit expert testimony on 
battered woman syndrome).  But cf. Andrea L. Earhart, Note, Should a Defendant Be 
Denied the Affirmative Defense of Self Defense if the Criminal Act Was Not Intentional? Self 
Defense or Defense for Self? Duran v. State, 990 P.2d 1005 (Wyo. 1999), 1 WYO. L REV. 
695 (2001) (observing that the Wyoming Supreme Court did not allow expert 
testimony of battered woman syndrome as it is not considered an affirmative 
defense but used only to establish the defendant’s state of mind during the 
homicide). 
 24. See Amy R. Melner, Rights of Abused Mothers vs. Best Interest of Abused 
Children: Courts’ Termination of Battered Women’s Parental Rights due to Failure to Protect 
Their Children from Abuse, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 299, 325-28 (1998) 
(arguing for a rationality approach for courts to consider when assessing 
affirmative acts mothers used to protect their children from abuse); see also Mary 
E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families: Social Support Systems, 
Custody Outcomes and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13 
(1995) (highlighting the lack of social support for mothers who escape abuse with 
their children makes the choice to leave a difficult one); Clark, supra note 21, at 
293 (emphasizing that the burdens and consequences should fall on the 
perpetrator of the crime, not the abused victim); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic 
Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the 
6
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Battered mothers need an affirmative defense that opposes 
societal presumptions that they made no attempts to protect their 
children from violence.  Traumatic paralysis can be used as the 
foundation of duress to bolster the abused woman’s assertions.25  
Traumatic paralysis is the merging of the psychological phenomena 
of traumatic bonding with the duress defense.26  It is likened to a 
self-defense model with the use of battered woman syndrome.27  
Expert testimony would be garnered to support the duress claim 
and explain the perceived lack of activity on the part of the abused 
mother to protect her child from the abuser.28  An affirmative 
defense of traumatic paralysis should only be available under 
narrowly prescribed circumstances.  For example, mothers who are 
culpable in the deaths of their children without a history of an 
abusive relationship should not be given the opportunity to use 
traumatic paralysis.29  Other affirmative defenses can be used for 
such cases.30 
Courts are far less accepting of women who cannot save their 
children from abuse.31  Failure to protect laws seem fashioned to 
 
Courts, 27 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1993) (warning that reforms may be insufficient in light 
of gender discrimination in the litigation process); V. Pualani Enos, Prosecuting 
Battered Mothers: State Laws’ Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 229 (1996) (detailing the deficiencies of failure to protect laws 
as currently written); Jacobs, supra note 17, at 655 (encouraging continued efforts 
to understand the effects of violence on women and evaluate whether the threat of 
violence legitimately fits in the duress defense); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images 
of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 94 (1991) 
(concluding that recognizing oppression will facilitate addressing dangers faced 
and enhance capacity for change in the legal system); Linda J. Panko, Legal 
Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who Fail to Protect Their Children from Their 
Male Partner’s Abuse, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S  L.J. 67 (1995) (reviewing statutory 
developments emerging to address statutory deficiencies); Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95, 111 (1993) (noting that while courts 
generally treat female criminals more leniently than male criminals, courts treat 
criminal mothers the harshest for violating their traditional maternal role); Karen 
D. McDonald, Note, Michigan’s Efforts to Hold Women Criminally and Civilly Liable for 
Failure to Protect: Implications for Battered Women, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 289, 307-09 
(1998) (suggesting that the Michigan Legislature adopt an affirmative defense 
statute for both the criminal neglect and child abuse statutes). 
 25. Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work 
and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 215-17 
(1986). 
 26. Id. at 216. 
 27. Id. at 215. 
 28. Id. at 216. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, 
7
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prosecute mothers, not fathers.32 Overcoming the societal 
expectation that the mother is the ultimate defender of her child 
presents a daunting task.  Constructing a legal standard for a 
mother who fails to save her child’s life becomes nearly impossible.  
Many courts apply an objective or strict liability standard in failure 
to protect cases.33  No explanation of abuse the mother endured 
would counter her failure to intervene under such legal standards.34  
A subjective legal standard would allow the court to view the 
duration and intensity of the abusive relationship through the eyes 
of a reasonable battered woman.35 
 
and Class in the Child Protection System, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 584-85 & nn.40-41 (1997) 
(citing Bernadine Dohrn, Bad Mothers, Good Mothers, and the State: Children on the 
Margins, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1, 5 (1995) (discussing bias in the legal 
and child protection systems) and Becker, supra note 24, at 15 (noting that 
mothers are prosecuted in greater numbers than fathers for failure to protect 
their abused children and are held to higher standards)). 
 32. See Panko, supra note 24, at 68. 
Failure-to-protect laws have a disparate impact on women because men 
are more frequently active abusers and women often cannot protect 
themselves or their children from a male partner’s abuse . . . [because of] 
(1) fear of retaliation by the abuser; (2) economic dependence on the 
male abuser; (3) emotional dependence on the male abuser . . . and (4) 
family or legal pressures . . . . 
Id. 
 33. See discussion infra Part VI.C. (reviewing the objective and strict liability 
standards and accompanying cases); cf. Suzanne D’Amico, Comment, Inherently 
Female Cases of Child Abuse and Child Neglect: A Gender Neutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 855, 875 (2001) (arguing for an approach that seeks to redress the 
female over-representation in child abuse and neglect cases stating “[t]he biased 
application of failure to protect statutes perpetuate the myth that child abuse 
cases, even when the perpetrator is male, are ultimately the fault of the female.”). 
 34. D’Amico, supra note 33, at 874-75. 
 35. See discussion infra Part VI.C; see also Deborrah Ann Klis, Reforms to 
Criminal Defense Instructions: New Patterned Jury Instructions Which Account for the 
Experience of the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 131, 143-44 (1994) (arguing for a lower degree of culpability for battered 
woman who killed their mates and argues for a “reasonable battered woman 
standard”).  Klis discusses a jury instruction added to the California Evidence 
Code, under section 1107, to instruct juries on the importance of expert testimony 
in battered woman syndrome defenses.  Id. at 147-48.  Section 1107 defines the 
admissibility of expert evidence regarding battered women’s syndrome: 
(a)  In a criminal action, expert testimony is admissible by either the  
prosecution or the defense regarding [battered women’s syndrome], 
including the nature and effect of physical, emotional, or mental abuse 
on the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence, 
except when offered against a criminal defendant to prove the 
occurrence of the act or acts of abuse which form the basis of the 
criminal charge. 
(b) The foundation shall be sufficient for admission of this expert 
8
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This analysis of traumatic paralysis as an affirmative defense 
unfolds in five sections.36  A fundamental review of Dr. Lenore 
Walker’s studies explores the foundational structure of battered 
woman syndrome.37  Battered woman syndrome is next displayed as 
the psychological foundation of self-defense claims for women who 
kill their abusers.38  Next, the analogy is made that traumatic 
bonding and the psychological effects of women bound to their 
abusers are equivalent to battered woman syndrome.39  The analogy 
is then theorized to craft the affirmative defense in civil and 
criminal cases with the foundation of traumatic paralysis.40  In 
conclusion, an examination is conducted of the failure to protect 
laws, and a new legal standard is theorized that would address the 
conundrum of prosecuting battered women for their partners’ 
abuse.41 
II. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF BATTERED WOMEN 
Dr. Walker’s seminal study in the late 1970s sought to explain 
why women stay in abusive relationships.42  She interviewed more 
than 120 women43 and found consistent themes in their stories.44  
The women interviewed were a mixed group that represented all 
ages (seventeen to seventy-six years of age), races, religions, 
educational levels, cultures, and socioeconomic groups.45  The 
 
testimony if the proponent of the evidence establishes its relevancy and 
the proper qualifications of the expert witness.  Expert opinion testimony 
on battered women’s syndrome shall not be considered a new scientific 
technique whose reliability is unproven. 
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1107(a)-(b) (West 1995). 
 36. See discussion infra Part II. 
 37. See discussion infra Part III. 
 38. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 39. See discussion infra Part V. 
 40. See discussion infra Part VI. 
 41. See discussion infra Part VII. 
 42. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xvii (1979). 
 43. Id. at xiii. 
 44. Id. at 31. 
 45. Id.  Uniform application of battered woman syndrome is rejected by many 
scholars based on race and class standards Dr. Walker articulated.  See Sharon 
Angella Allard, Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome: A Black Feminist Perspective, 1 
UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 194-95 (1991) (arguing battered woman syndrome is a 
white woman’s syndrome and the intersectionality of race and gender should 
include women of color who may not meet the weak and scared typology that 
Walker’s theory promulgates); Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, Domestic Violence and 
Feminist Jurisprudence: Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 344 (1995) 
(arguing commonly held stereotypes have contributed to negative outcomes in 
9
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relationships spanned from the short term of two months to the 
long term of fifty-three years.46  Walker detailed nine similarities 
amongst battered women—the women (1) have low self-esteem, 
(2) believe common myths of battering relationships, (3) believe in 
the traditional feminine sex-role stereotype, (4) accept 
responsibility for their batterers’ actions, (5) suffer from guilt and 
deny feelings of terror and anger, (6) present passive public faces 
but can manipulate the home environment to stave off violence or 
death, (7) suffer from severe stress reactions, (8) use sex to 
establish intimacy, and (9) seek no outside assistance.47  In seeking 
to explicate the lives of the women Walker interviewed, she 
amassed two theories: learned helplessness and the cycle of 
violence.48 
In The Battered Woman, Walker applies the experiments of 
Martin Seligman to explain learned helplessness.49  Seligman 
placed dogs in cages and administered electrical shocks at random 
and varied intervals.50  The dogs quickly learned that no matter 
what response they attempted, they could not control the shocks.  
Initially, the dogs sought escape through various movements that 
did not lessen the shocks.51  Eventually, the dogs ceased further 
voluntary activity and became “compliant, passive and submissive.”52  
Even when the researchers gave the dogs an escape route, the dogs 
 
battered women’s cases in many respects). 
For instance, the notion that battered women are weak, passive, or 
pathological for “staying” with the abuser fuels society’s disbelief and 
distrust of the women’s claims, and resistance to providing protection or 
criminal prosecution of the abuser.  Inaccurate images of abusers as “out 
of control” monsters often cause judges and other officials to refuse to 
believe that the polite, calm, and “normal” man in front of them could 
be guilty of the horrible acts of which he is accused.  These same 
stereotypes can cause students to have difficulty advocating for, or 
effectively counseling, their clients; the representation may be negatively 
affected if students perceive the client as dysfunctional or sick.  This gap 
often arises if the client still cares for the abuser, who the students may 
assume is purely monstrous, and never charming or loving.  Moving 
students (and lawyers) beyond these stereotypes is therefore critical to 
their effectiveness as advocates. 
Id. at 344 (citations omitted). 
 46. WALKER, supra note 42, at 31. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 45-51, 55-70. 
 49. Id. at 46. 
 50. Id.; see also M.E.P Seligman et al., The Alleviation of Learned Helplessness in 
Dogs, 73  J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 256 (1968). 
 51. WALKER, supra note 42, at 46. 
 52. Id. 
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would not respond.53  Seligman’s theory was further refined and 
reformulated, based on later laboratory trials with human 
subjects.54  Walker extends Seligman’s research to explain why 
battered women lose their powers of discrimination and self-
preservation.55 
Walker summarizes the debilitating effect of learned 
helplessness on human problem solving skills. 
Repeated batterings, like electrical shocks, diminish the 
woman’s motivation to respond.  She becomes passive.  
Secondly, her cognitive ability to perceive success is 
changed.  She does not believe her response will result in 
a favorable outcome, whether or not it might . . . .56  The 
learning ability is hampered and the repertoire of 
responses from which people can choose is narrowed.  In 
this way, battered women become blind to their options.57 
The cyclical nature of the violence compounds the battered 
woman’s experience of learned helplessness.58 
Walker attempts to answer the perplexing question of why 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 86 (1984). 
 55. Contra MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN ET AL., LEARNED HELPLESSNESS 238-39 
(1993).  The authors disagree with Walker’s use of learned helplessness to explain 
the perceived passivity of battered women, finding a different answer as to why 
women remain with their husbands who beat them.  Id.  The authors find: 
Contrary to what one might expect, the frequency and severity of beating 
is not related strongly to whether a wife leaves an abusive husband.  
Theorists have thus searched for other reasons.  There is support for two 
factors that make sense: psychological commitment to the marriage and 
economic dependency. 
Id. at 238 (citations omitted).  The authors further note that Walker is incorrect in 
the methodology she uses in explaining the passivity of battered women:  
“[Walker] argues that traditional socialization imparts to women a belief in their 
own helplessness.  Further, she finds that a large proportion of abused wives were 
abused as children, which satisfie[d] . . . the requirement that uncontrolled events 
precedes helpless behavior.”  Id. at 239.  However, the authors bluntly state 
learned helplessness is “misunderstood by this theorist.”  Id.  The authors note that 
the passivity observed among victims of domestic violence is a “middling example” 
of learned helplessness: 
Passivity is present, but it may well be instrumental.  Cognitions of 
helplessness are present, as is a history of uncontrollability.  But there 
may also be a history of explicit reinforcement for passivity.  Taken 
together, the results do not constitute the best possible support for 
concluding that [abused women] show learned helplessness. 
Id. 
 56. WALKER, supra note 42, at 49-50. 
 57. Id. at 48. 
 58. Id. at 49. 
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women stay in violent relationships with her Cycle Theory of 
Violence.59  Walker’s tension reduction theory details three distinct 
phases found in a recurring battering cycle: (1) tension building, 
(2) the acute battering incident, and (3) loving contrition.60  
Battered women endure the first two phases to experience the love 
and contrition of the last phase.61  The unfortunate reality for these 
relationships is that battered women risk their lives waiting for the 
approach of the last phase.62 
Walker acknowledges that battering incidents take place 
during the first phase but the gravity of the violence of the acute 
battering incident distinguishes the first and second phases.63  The 
second phase is uncontrollable, destructive, and brief.64  This phase 
causes the most severe physical violence and psychological stress to 
battered women due to not knowing when the acute violent 
incident will occur.65  Women involved in long-term battering 
relationships may provoke the acute battering incident to cease 
living with the anticipation of violence.66  The batterer attempts to 
discipline the woman after her behavior infuriates him enough to 
justify his violent behavior.67  Walker finds that the violence the 
batterer uses to impose authority is so brutal that the batterer 
exceeds his original intent and severely beats the woman.68  Thus, 
 
 59. Walker explains that the third phase of the cycle theory of violence 
involves the batterer convincing his victim that the abuse was a one-time incident 
that will never happen again.  Id. at 65.  Contra Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing 
and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on 
Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 220 (1986) (finding the underlying theme 
throughout the expert testimony cases is the dilemma that victimization poses for 
feminist legal theory:  “Examination of the expert testimony cases on battering has 
suggested that a perspective like battered woman syndrome, which either 
emphasizes victimization or which is susceptible to being characterized as 
victimization, raises serious problems for women in theory and practice.”). 
 60. WALKER, supra note 54, at 95. 
 61. See WALKER, supra note 42, at 69 (explaining that the rewards of the 
relationship for the battered woman come during this phase, even though she may 
not realize that “she has traded her psychological and physical safety for this 
temporary dream state”). 
 62. See id. at 62 (explaining the loss of control common in phase two: “The 
violence has an element of overkill to it, and the man cannot stop even if the 
woman is severely injured.”). 
 63. Id. at 59. 
 64. Id. at 59-60. 
 65. Id. at 59-61. 
 66. Id at 60. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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the batterer becomes guilt-ridden and contrite.69 
The batterer then adopts the persona of a charming, 
affectionate, apologetic mate who promises the battered woman 
that he will never engage in such violent behavior again.70  Walker 
explains that the battering partner has supposedly learned never to 
act in such a fashion again and believes he has taught the battered 
woman not to engage in behavior that would trigger another 
violent encounter.71  The battered woman in this phase is 
particularly vulnerable to persuasions to remain with the batterer 
made by friends or family members engaged on his behalf.72  
Walker notes that immediately after a violent encounter, the 
woman is convinced of her desire to cease being a victim.73  
However, once the women resumed contact with their violent 
mates, the relationship continued.74  The women face pressure not 
to destroy the family, even if the batterer is to blame for the rift in 
the relationship.75  Battered women convince themselves they will 
 
 69. Id. at 65. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 65-66.  Cf. Jane Maslow Cohen, Self Defense and Relations of 
Domination: Moral and Legal Perspectives on Battered Women Who Kill: Regimes of Private 
Tyranny: What Do They Mean to Morality and for the Criminal Law?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
757, 762-63 (1996) (describing relationships that fit the mold of private tyrannies 
as dissimilar to battering relationships). 
Although battering may well play a role in their maintenance, it is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of their existence.  In fact, 
private tyrannies may be organized and maintained on a variety of 
different terms.  These terms may evolve, at the discretion of the person 
denominated the tyrant, in response to an endogenous shift in 
preferences, an exogenous change in circumstances, or both.  The 
condition that is necessary to the maintenance of a regime of private 
tyranny is that the life of at least one person who lives or formerly lived in 
the same household with the tyrant be subject to his domination and 
control in respect to such objectively important elements of everyday life 
that a reasonable member of society would not ordinarily consent to live 
under the same terms and conditions and would not view the consent of 
any other person to live under such circumstances as a rational exercise 
of choice.  As a matter of rational reconstruction, then, the structure of 
private tyranny and its relationship to the concept of consent is 
analogous to  the  much-referenced  but  little  demonstrated  example of 
voluntary slavery.  It is not a subject to which the idea of consent lends 
any justificatory distinction. 
Id. 
 72. WALKER, supra note 42, at 66-69. 
 73. Id. at 66. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 66-67. 
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no longer suffer abuse.76  The batterers adopt behavior that the 
women idealize, thus prolonging the relationship and endangering 
the lives of the woman and her children.77 
The criminal justice community has not universally accepted 
battered woman syndrome as a means to defend women who are 
charged with murdering their abusers.78  Several cases reveal that 
courts are hesitant to accept the rubric of battered woman 
syndrome under the guise of self-defense without an imminent 
threat to a woman’s life.79  The legal community questions whether 
such conclusions can be drawn about the existence of battered 
woman syndrome.80 
Dr. Lenore Walker’s studies and analyses have been attacked as 
being statistically inconclusive at best, and at worst as labeling 
 
 76. Id. at 67. 
 77. Id. at 66; see also Christine Nicole Becker, Clemency for Killers? Pardoning 
Battered Women Who Strike Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297, 305 (1995) (citing Nancy 
Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 43).  Patricia Kastle, an Olympic 
skier, was shot by her former husband even though she had a restraining order 
against him.  Id.  Shirley Lowery’s former boyfriend stabbed her nineteen times 
with a butcher knife in the corridor of the courtroom where she went to get a 
restraining order.  Id.  Finally, Lisa Bianco was beat to death with the butt of a 
shotgun by her husband when he was out of jail on an eight-hour pass.  Id. 
 78. Cf. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, 
Not Syndromes, out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211 (2002).  Burke argues 
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) does not withstand empirical scrutiny and the 
basis of Dr. Lenore Walker’s research is flawed.  Id. at 235-40.  Burke also argues 
that BWS would not be admissible as expert testimony under the standards of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), for expert testimony.  
Id. at 232-40. 
 79. See John W. Roberts, Between the Heat of Passion and Cold Blood: Battered 
Woman’s Syndrome as an Excuse for Self-Defense in Non-Confrontational Homicides, 27 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135 (2003); see also Pugh v. State, 382 S.E.2d 143 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1989) (overruling a state motion to exclude defendant’s evidence of battered 
woman’s syndrome); Rogers v. State, 616 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) 
(defendant sought to introduce battered woman syndrome evidence but was 
excluded from doing so by the trial court but the Florida Court of Appeals 
overturned the conviction).  Several cases follow the same appellate history.  See, 
e.g., Bonner v. State, 740 So.2d 439 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); Freeman v. State, 496 
S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1998); State v. Smith, 486 S.E.2d 819 (Ga. 1997); Commonwealth 
v. Craig, 783 S.W.2d 387 (Ky. 1990); State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1990); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474 (Nev. 2000);  People v. Torres, 488 
N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 970 (Ohio 1990); Bechtel v. 
State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992);  State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 
1984). 
 80. See Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths About the “Battered Woman’s Defense”: 
Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567 (1992); Mary Ann Dutton, 
Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman 
Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191 (1993). 
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battered women with a psychological disorder when the abuser is 
the actual culprit.81  The use of battered woman syndrome as a self-
defense claim has also garnered controversy.82  Many courts fail to 
distinguish the use of self-defense under the traditional model of 
immediate threat of death or great bodily harm versus the use of 
battered woman syndrome to explain the pervasive and threatening 
environment in which battered women live.83  Despite the 
controversy, federal and state courts allow battered woman 
syndrome and expert testimony about its effects.84  A review of the 
use of battered woman syndrome in self-defense cases will divulge 
the reasons for the conflicting positions of the courts. 
III. SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN 
Defenses to criminal charges fall into two categories: 
justifications and excuses.85  A justification defense contends that, 
although the State may be able to prove the charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the defendant was justified in her actions and 
should not be held criminally responsible.86  An excuse defense 
allows the defendant to commit a criminal act under the mistaken 
 
 81. See ROBBIN S. OGLE & SUSAN JACOBS, SELF-DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMEN 
WHO KILL: A NEW FRAMEWORK 53 (2002). 
 82. Id.  (explaining that non-confrontational cases where the abuser is killed 
are the most troubling for the court to allow defense counsel to use self-defense 
claims and allow expert testimony on battered woman syndrome); see also Anne M. 
Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994) (critiquing the feminist view of 
the battered woman syndrome defense); David L. Faigman, The Battered Women 
Syndrome and Self Defense: A Legal & Empirical Dissent, 72 VA. L. REV. 619 (1986) 
(addressing the relationship of the battered woman syndrome and the self-defense 
doctrine).  Both authors argue against the accepted notions of battered woman 
syndrome.  Id.  Coughlin finds that men are not allowed defenses that explain the 
pressures exerted by their spouses in similar situations.  Id.  Faigman strongly 
argues against the general acceptance of battered woman syndrome considering it 
is not scientifically sound research.  Id. 
 83. See discussion supra Part II (describing cases and discussing the 
acceptance of battered woman syndrome in trial courts). 
 84. Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and Its Effects in 
Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 75, 85 (1996) (stating that sixteen federal 
courts and twelve state statutes allow battered woman syndrome expert testimony). 
 85. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 (University of Chicago Press 1979) 
(1769).  Blackstone recognized justifiable homicides as those in which the slayer is 
not in the minutest degree at fault and excusable homicides as those in which 
there is some fault, some error or omission so trivial, that the law excuses it from 
the guilt of felony.  Id. 
 86. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 101. 
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belief that such force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily 
harm.87  The defendant will be held criminally responsible, but to 
lesser charges.88 
LaFave and Scott recognize self-defense as a justification 
defense.89  However, many legal scholars reject the notion that self-
defense should be used as a justification defense.90  Peter Heberling 
notes that a justification defense is one that excuses conduct that is 
otherwise criminal and allows such conduct to be socially 
acceptable.91  One critic finds no substantiation for the use of 
justification or excuse in self-defense cases: 
The tension between justification and excuse exists just as 
a tension exists between an objective and subjective 
“reasonable person” standard.  To allow a killer to 
subjectively individualize the reasonable man standard is 
to excuse the conduct of the killer because of her lack of a 
culpable mental state.  If killing in self-defense is truly a 
justifiable action under criminal law theory, are we saying 
that anyone afflicted with battered woman syndrome may 
kill her abusive partner at any time, with or without 
immediate or imminent provocation because of the 
constant fear of attack?92 
Courts have recognized that killing is justifiable under specific 
circumstances that predate the battered woman syndrome, such as 
a threat of great bodily harm or death in non-intimate 
relationships.93 
Self-defense also includes the concept of mutual combat.94  
 
 87. Id.; see also State v. Torres, 393 S.E.2d 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990). 
 88. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 101. 
 89. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 454-56 (2d ed. 
1986). 
 90. Peter D.W. Heberling, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal Code on 
Statutory Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 916 (1975); Roberts, supra note 79. 
 91. Heberling, supra note 90, at 916. 
 92. Roberts, supra note 79, at 155. 
 93. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 119. 
 94. Donaldson v. State, 289 S.E.2d 242, 244 (Ga. 1982) (“Mutual combat . . . 
generally involves deadly weapons and the mutual intention of using them.”) 
(citing Powell v. State, 239 S.E.2d 560 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)).  A mutual combat 
situation arises when “both parties are at fault and are willing to fight because of a 
sudden quarrel.”  McClendon v. State, 199 S.E.2d 904, 905 (Ga. 1973).  The 
mutual intention to fight need not be proved directly, but may be inferred by the 
jury from the conduct of the parties.  Id.; see also, Ison v. State, 118 S.E. 721 (Ga. 
1923); Bailey v. State, 96 S.E. 862 (Ga. 1918); Spradlin v. State, 286 S.E.2d 310 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 1981); Peacock v. State, 267 S.E.2d 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Knight v. 
State, 37 S.E.2d 435 (Ga. Ct. App. 1946). 
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Mutual combat allows the defendant to use as much force as 
necessary to thwart the violence of the perpetrator.95  Courts 
recognize that defendants have the right to use deadly force to 
quell a violent attack that would otherwise lead to the defendant’s 
imminent death.96  The introduction of battered woman syndrome 
to bolster self-defense claims by battered women does not fit the 
classic paradigm of self-defense.97  The defense calls for courts to 
instruct juries not on an objective belief that the defendant’s life 
was in danger, but on a subjective belief that based on what the 
defendant knew at the time of the homicide, the defendant’s 
actions were justifiable or excusable.98 
 
 95. Daniel G. Saunders, Wife Abuse, Husband Abuse or Mutual Combat? A 
Feminist Perspective on the Empirical Findings, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 
90, 107 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).  Saunders notes many victims 
do not draw the distinction between mutual combat and self-defense.  Id. 
 96. See Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80 (1877); State v. Wells, 1 N.J.L. 424 (N.J. 
Sup. Ct. 1790); see also, Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546 (1896) (asserting right 
of self-defense valid when one seeks to take another’s life); Alberty v. United 
States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896) (arguing that a person who fears for his life may use 
the force necessary to repel the assault); Lane v. State, 222 A.2d 263 (Del. 1966) 
(asserting a person may use no more force than is necessary to ward off a 
threatened injury); State v. Abbott, 174 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1961) (noting that use of 
deadly force to prevent a violent attack leading to imminent death is appropriate); 
State v. Ronnie, 125 A.2d 163 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1956) (noting that one may 
intervene for the defense of a third person using means that he would use to 
protect himself from a similar confrontation); State v. Centalonza, 86 A.2d 780 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1952) (asserting one can justify his attempt to take the 
life of another only if his own life was threatened and the danger could not 
otherwise be avoided); State v. Goldberg, 79 A.2d 702, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1951) (arguing that one may meet the force of his assailant if the force is 
necessary); Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 124 A.2d 407 (Pa. Super Ct. 1956) (noting 
one who feels life is in jeopardy may defend himself whether the danger is real or 
apparent); Mewes v. State, 517 P.2d 487 (Wyo. 1973) (noting the validity of a plea 
of self-defense rests on the excuse of an otherwise unlawful homicide, battery, or 
assault).  Cf. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896); Beard v. United States, 
158 U.S. 550 (1895); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (Ohio 1876). 
 97. See supra Parts II, III.  The Model Penal Code recognizes three categories 
of self-defense for battered women: confrontational, non-confrontational, and 
third party.  MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 3.04-.05 (1985). 
 98. See Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418 (7th Cir. 1992); People v. Aris, 
264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294 (Mo. 2000); 
State v. Edwards, 60 S.W.3d 602 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Gaines, 36 P.3d 438 
(N.M. 2001); In re Glenn G., 587 N.Y.S.2d 464 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1992); State v. Purdy, 
491 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1992); State v. Rambousek, 479 N.W.2d 832 (N.D. 1992); 
State v. Ronne, 458 N.W.2d 294 (N.D. 1990); State v. Frey, 441 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 
1989); State v. Thiel, 411 N.W.2d 66 (N.D. 1987); State v. White, 390 N.W.2d 43 
(N.D. 1986); State v. Lang, 378 N.W.2d 205 (N.D. 1985); State v. Kolobakken, 347 
N.W.2d 569 (N.D. 1984); State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1983); State v. 
Liedholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983), State v. Jacob, 222 N.W.2d 586, 588-89 
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Defense attorneys have used Dr. Walker’s theories of learned 
helplessness and the cycles of violence to proffer defenses that 
explain the psychological trauma of being the victim in a battering 
relationship.99  Requesting that jurors take the subjective viewpoint 
of the battered woman may answer the question many jurors pose: 
Why would an abused woman stay in a violent relationship?100  Dr. 
Walker’s theories help articulate what battered women cannot.101  
Defense attorneys no longer have choices of how to utilize Walker’s 
theory of battered woman syndrome—self-defense is the only 
option.102  The insanity defense is no longer a viable defense 
 
(N.D. 1974); State v. Hazlett, 113 N.W. 374 (N.D. 1907); State v. Thomas, 673 
N.E.2d 1339 (Ohio 1997); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); 
State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1992); State v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558-59 
(Wash. 1977); State v. Kelly, 655 P.2d 1202 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Adams, 
641 P.2d 1207 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Painter, 620 P.2d 1001 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1980); cf. People v. Robinson, 261 N.W.2d 544 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977) 
(asserting the jury shall discern whether the defendant actually believed that he or 
she was in danger rather than whether a reasonable man under the circumstances 
would have believed himself to be in danger). 
 99. Many legal scholars do not accept Dr. Walker’s analysis of battered 
women having a psychological syndrome.  See Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered 
Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 
1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 113 (1994) (advocating for a focus on ordinary factual 
evidence and the pattern of battering, rather than battered woman syndrome). 
 100. Mira Mihaljovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, 
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IN. L.J. 1253, 1263 (1987); see also 
Richard Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 659 (1976).  
Gelles found where the violence was less frequent and less severe the woman was 
more likely to stay in the relationship.  Id. at 666.  How much abuse the woman 
endured as a child gauged also whether the woman would stay in the abusive 
relationship.  Id. at 667. 
 101. Defendants charged with murdering their abusers have sought to 
introduce the history of abuse only to be denied by the trial and appellate courts.  
See Moran v. Ohio, 469 U.S. 948, 950 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Arcoren v. 
United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (8th Cir. 1991); Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 
407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979); Victoria M. Mather, The Skeleton in the Closet: The 
Battered Woman Syndrome, Self-Defense, and Expert Testimony, 39 MERCER L. REV. 545 
(1988) (analyzing the problems battered women encounter in court). 
 102. Cf. Burke, supra note 78, at 218 (“[T]he defendant who claims self-
defense must be treated (and judged) as a rational actor.  Under the rational actor 
approach, whether a defendant’s belief is reasonable must be determined in light 
of her objective individual circumstances, not from her own psychologically-
individualized perspective.”).  Burke further argues “the rational battered 
woman’s necessary uses of force can be justified by realigning, rather than 
expanding, the right to use defensive force.”  Id. at 219.  “The current standard for 
self-defense correlates only imperfectly with necessary uses of force.”  Id.  “In other 
words, the standard sometimes punishes acts that are necessary, and sometimes 
exculpates acts that are not.”  Id.  Accordingly, Burke argues “that changing the 
rules of self-defense to encompass more accurately the standard of necessity is 
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because it carries a heavier burden because of past political and 
legal changes.103 
Creative defense attorneys may utilize self-defense to explain 
the battered woman’s violent reaction to her mate.  However, 
greater hurdles exist depending upon which form of self-defense 
an attorney uses.  Courts are reticent to accept an affirmative 
defense, such as self-defense without proof of imminent or 
immediate threats of great bodily harm or death.104 
 
simply a realignment, and not an expansion, of the right to defensive force.”  Id. 
“The battered woman syndrome theory, in contrast, has the potential to expand 
significantly the application of self-defense by excusing unnecessary killings, 
simply because they were committed by sympathetic actors.”  Id. 
 103. The insanity defense is extremely hard to utilize.  See AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: POSITION STATEMENT (1982), available at 
http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/198202.pdf; see also 
Stuart M. Kirschner & Gary J. Galperin, Psychiatric Defenses in New York: Pleas and 
Results, 29 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 194 (2001) (noting the insanity defense is 
rarely proffered).  That test holds that a person would “not [be] responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or 
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality 
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of 
law.”  AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, supra, at 2.  The attempted assassination of former 
President Ronald Regan by John Hinckley and his being found not guilty by 
reason of insanity in 1982 destroyed the use of the insanity defense.  Id. at 10-11.  
Following the Hinckley case, Congress altered the U.S. federal and military 
standards for the insanity defense, limiting it to the so-called “cognitive prong” of 
the ALI test—that a defendant would not be responsible if “as a result of severe 
mental disease or defect, [he] was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or 
the wrongfulness of his acts.”  Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 § 403(a), 18 
U.S.C. § 4241 (2000).  Altogether, three quarters of the states and the federal 
government have imposed some form of insanity defense reform since Hinckley’s 
1982 acquittal.  HENRY J. STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: 
EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 35-39 (1993).  The insanity defense is not 
often used, and when used is frequently unsuccessful.  See Kirschner & Galperin, 
supra, at 195.  According to a 1991 eight-state study funded by the National 
Institute of Mental Health, the insanity defense was used in less than one percent 
of the cases in a representative sampling of cases before those states’ county 
courts.  Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas: 
An Eight State Study, 19 BULL AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331-38 (1991).  The study 
showed that only twenty-six percent of those insanity pleas were argued 
successfully.  Id. at 408.  Most studies show that in approximately eighty percent of 
the cases where a defendant is acquitted on a “not guilty by reason of insanity” 
finding, it is because the prosecution and defense have agreed on the 
appropriateness of the plea before trial.  See Raymond Lande, The Military Insanity 
Defense, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 93, 197 (1991). 
 104. See State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989).  The North Carolina 
Supreme Court overturned a lower court opinion that granted a new trial to the 
defendant because she was denied the right to a self-defense instruction.  Id. at 9.  
The court found that the defendant’s killing her husband in his sleep did not rise 
to imminent fear of death or great bodily harm even though she claimed she was a 
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The classic model of self-defense falls into categories of perfect 
and imperfect.  The Model Penal Code explicates the use of a 
perfect self-defense model in the use of deadly force.105  The 
defendant must believe that the use of deadly force is immediately 
necessary to protect himself or herself against death, serious bodily 
injury, forcible rape, or kidnapping.106  Additionally, the use of 
deadly force must be justified by a reasonable belief standard: “the 
privilege of self-defense is based on reasonable appearances, rather 
than on objective reality . . . . A person is justified in using force to 
protect himself if he subjectively believes that such force is 
necessary to repel an imminent unlawful attack, even if 
appearances prove to be false.”107  Perfect self-defense requires both 
subjective honesty on the part of the defendant and objective 
reasonableness.  The defendant must actually and honestly believe 
that deadly force is necessary for her protection, and her belief 
must be objectively reasonable.108  If the subjective and objective 
elements are met, then the defendant will be completely 
exonerated.109 
Common law recognizes the use of imperfect self-defense.110  
Traditionally, the common law rule was that if any element 
necessary to prove self-defense is lacking, the defense is wholly 
 
battered woman.  Id.; see also People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 183 (Ct. App. 1989) 
(affirming conviction of allegedly battered woman who killed her husband while 
he was sleeping); State v. Baldwin, 412 S.E.2d 31, 37 (N.C. 1992) (upholding lower 
court’s decision to exclude testimony on defendant’s hearsay statements to 
psychologist); State v. Fisher, 563 S.E.2d 100, 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (refusing to 
overturn conviction based on lower court’s failure to instruct jury on imperfect 
self-defense); State v. Jackson, 550 S.E.2d 225, 229-30 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that defendant was not entitled to jury instruction on self defense); 
Robinson v. State, 417 S.E.2d 88, 90 (S.C. 1992) (holding that defendant’s 
attorney was not negligent in failing to present battered woman’s syndrome 
defense). 
 105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1985) (governing use of force in self-
protection). 
 106. Id. § 3.04 (2)(b); see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 251 
(3d ed. 2001). 
 107. DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 222. 
 108. OGLE & JACOBS, supra note 81, at 114. 
 109. See, e.g., State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984) (overturning the 
defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder because of an inadequate jury 
instruction on the defendant’s suffering from battered woman syndrome and her 
subjective belief based upon the history of violence in the relationship). 
 110. See, e.g., People v. Gregory, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 776, 791 (Ct. App. 2002), 
review granted, 58 P.3d 928 (Cal. 2002), review dismissed and cause remanded (holding 
that delusion alone is not enough to support an imperfect self-defense). 
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unavailable to a defendant.111  Some states “recognize a so-called 
‘imperfect’ or ‘incomplete’ defense of self-defense to murder, 
which results in conviction for the lesser offense of either voluntary 
or involuntary manslaughter.”112  For example, a defendant who 
fails to satisfy the “reasonableness” component, although his belief 
was genuine, might be able to assert an “imperfect”113 or 
“incomplete” claim of self-defense, mitigating his crime to 
manslaughter.114 
The Model Penal Code recognizes three categories of 
imperfect self-defense for battered women.115  Confrontational 
homicide occurs when a battered woman kills her partner during a 
battering incident.116  In such cases, an instruction on self-defense is 
usually given.117  Courts now routinely permit a battered woman to 
introduce evidence of the decedent’s prior abusive treatment of 
 
 111. See DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 231. 
 112. Id.  Expert testimony on battering and its effects is most readily accepted 
by state courts in cases involving traditional self-defense situations, i.e., it has been 
accepted by ninety percent of the states in such circumstances.  Parrish, supra note 
84, at 84.  Expert testimony has also been admitted by a substantial number of 
state courts in nontraditional self-defense situations, “such as where a battered 
woman kills her batterer while he is sleeping (accepted by twenty-nine percent of 
the states) or by hiring a third party to kill him (accepted by twenty percent of the 
states).”  Id. 
 113. See CAL. JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 5.17 (2005).  Section 5.17 states: 
A person who kills another person in the actual but unreasonable belief 
in the necessity to defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily 
injury, kills unlawfully but does not harbor malice aforethought and is 
not guilty of murder.  This would be so even though a reasonable person 
in the same situation seeing and knowing the same facts would not have 
had the same belief.  Such an actual but unreasonable belief is not a 
defense to the crime of [voluntary] [or] [involuntary] manslaughter. 
Id.  
 114. See e.g. State v. Necaise, 466 So.2d 660 (La. 1990) (affirming the lower 
court decision that allowed the trial court to include the necessity to retreat as part 
of the defendant’s self-defense instruction to the jury).  The jury denied the 
defendant did not act in self-defense.  Id. at 669. 
 115. See DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 235-49 (outlining Battered Women’s 
Syndrome). 
 116. Id. (discussing “confrontational” homicides). 
 117. See e.g., CAL. CRIM.  JURY INSTRUCTION § 5.13.  Section 5.13 states: 
Homicide is justifiable and not unlawful when committed by any person 
in the defense of [one’s self] if [the person] actually and reasonably 
believed that the individual killed intended to commit a forcible and 
atrocious crime and that there was imminent danger of that crime being 
accomplished.  A person may act upon appearances whether the danger 
is real or merely apparent. 
Id. 
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her.118  Non-confrontational homicide occurs when a “battered 
woman kills her abuser while he is asleep, or during a significant 
lull in the violence.”119  “Courts are divided on whether self-defense 
may be claimed if there is no evidence of threatening conduct by 
the abuser at the time of the homicide, although the majority 
position is that homicide under such circumstances is 
unjustified.”120 
The most difficult of the imperfect self-defense cases is the 
third-party killer cases.  The battered woman hires or importunes 
another to kill her abusive partner and then pleads self-defense to 
the charge of murder.121  In third-party hired-killer cases, courts 
have collectively refused to permit self-defense instructions.122 
Thus, self-defense claims can be used effectively to defend 
women who kill their abusers.  Battered woman syndrome aids even 
women who kill in non-confrontational situations.  The next 
section explores how traumatic bonding can be used in a similar 
fashion to explain inaction instead of reaction to violent 
relationships.  Jurisdictions are mixed on deciding which types of 
cases justify a self-defense claim, but women who fail to act or use 
strategies that fail to stop the abuse do not have nuanced defenses 
like self-defense for their lack of action. 
 
 118. Cf. Beth Bjerregaard & Anita Neuberger Blowers, The Appropriateness of the 
Frye Test in Determining the Admissibility of the Battered Woman Syndrome in the 
Courtroom, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1 (1996) (reviewing inconsistent admissibility 
standards set by differing jurisdictions for battered woman syndrome and arguing 
that the courts mistakenly focus on the theory of battered woman syndrome and 
not the methodology used by Walker).  The authors contend that the Frye test is 
inappropriate to determine the admissibility of expert testimony on battered 
woman syndrome.  Id. at 22. 
 119. See DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 235-49. 
 120. Id. at 241; see also State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) 
(overturning the conviction of the defendant for voluntary manslaughter after she 
shot and stabbed her ex-husband, killing him while he slept).  The defendant was 
not allowed to raise battered woman syndrome as part of her claim of self-defense.  
Id. at 1273-74.  This decision has been severely criticized.  See Schopp et al., supra 
note 99, at 52-53. 
 121. DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 241 (discussing battered woman syndrome 
and third party hired killer cases). 
 122. Id.; see also Monique M. Gousie, From Self-Defense to Coercion: McMaugh v. 
State Use of Battered Woman’s Syndrome to Defend Wife's Involvement in Third-Party 
Murder, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 453 (1993) (discussing how courts have dealt with jury 
instructions). 
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IV. THE FOUNDATION OF TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS 
A. Traumatic Bonding 
Donald Dutton and Susan Painter developed the theory of 
traumatic bonding and argued that powerful emotional 
attachments develop from two specific features of abusive 
relationships: power imbalances and intermittent good 
treatment.123  The power imbalance makes the maltreated person 
perceive herself as subjugated or dominated by the other.124  The 
abused woman perceives the first abusive incident to be an 
anomaly.125  The abused woman operates to strengthen the affective 
attachment to the abuser because she does not believe that the 
abuse will be repetitive and inescapable.126  “Repeated incidents of 
greater severity tend to shift the woman’s cognition to the belief 
that the violence will recur unless she does something to prevent 
it.”127  However, by the time the woman realizes that the abuse is 
inescapable;128 the traumatically produced emotional bond is quite 
 
 123. Donald Dutton & Susan Painter, Emotional Attachments in Abusive 
Relationships: A Test of Traumatic Bonding Theory, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 105, 105 
(1993). 
 124. Id. at 106; see Virginia Goldner et al., Love and Violence Gender Paradoxes in 
Volatile Attachments, 29 FAM. PROCESS 343, 364 (1990) (arguing that abusive 
relationships exemplify the stereotypical gender arrangement that structure 
intimacy between men and woman generally, and the authors propose that 
paradoxical gender relationships create unsolvable dilemmas that can explode 
into violence); see also Avonne Mason & Virginia Blankenship, Power and Affiliation 
Motivation, Stress, and Abuse in Intimate Relationships, 52 J. PERSONALITY SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 203, 209 (1987) (showing that abused women are more likely than 
abused men to suffer ill effects throughout the rest of their lives). 
 125. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106. 
 126. Id.; see Ruth Ann Belknap, Why Did She Do That? Issues of Moral Conflict in 
Battered Women’s Decision Making, 20 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 387 (1999).  
The author asks the ultimate question of moral conflict for abused women: “Must 
a woman believe her life to be at stake in order for her to make choices that 
protect self and to feel that such a choice is morally correct?”  Id. at 402; see also 
Vicki A. Moss et al., The Experience of Terminating an Abusive Relationship from an 
Anglo and African American Perspective: A Qualitative Descriptive Study, 18 ISSUES IN 
MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 433 (1997) (addressing the question of “why don’t they 
leave?”). 
 127. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106. 
 128. See Ileana Arias & Karen T. Pape, Psychological Abuse: Implications for 
Adjustment and Commitment to Leave Violent Partners, 14 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 55 
(1999).  The authors stress the importance of assessing for psychological abuse 
which is a significant predictor of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  Id. at 
62.  Psychological abuse was found to be a greater precursor for PTSD than 
physical abuse.  Id.  An abused woman who suffered from PTSD was less likely to 
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strong.129  The wellspring of the emotional bond is the power 
imbalance in the relationship.130 
Dutton and Painter base their theory on social psychologists’ 
research in the dynamics of unequal power relationships.  Such 
research has demonstrated that, over time, the imbalance of these 
relationships can generate individual pathology.131  The 1978 
prisoner study reported anxiety and depression in volunteer 
subjects after only four days of playing the role of “prisoners” who 
were relegated to powerlessness in a simulated prison situation.132  
A leadership study reported “increased redirected aggression in 
powerless members of autocratic groups” and researchers reported 
“Jewish prisoners’ compulsive copying of the behavior and 
expressed attitudes of the Nazi prison guards,” identifying with 
their aggressor.133  “Where a person of high power (dominator) is 
intermittently punitive, subjugated persons might adopt the 
dominator’s assumed perspective of themselves, and internalize or 
redirect aggression towards others similar to themselves.”134 
As the power imbalance magnifies, the oppressed person has a 
more negative self-appraisal, is less capable of fending for herself, 
and is, thus, increasingly more in need of the dominator.135 “The 
cycle of relationship-produced dependency and lowered self-
 
leave an abusive relationship.  Id. at 61-62.  Women who were able to conceive of 
termination of the abusive relationship as a viable option were not hampered by 
psychological distress.  Id. at 65. 
 129. Diane R. Follingstad et al., Justifiability, Sympathy Level, and 
Internal/External Locus of the Reasons Battered Women Remain in Abusive Relationships, 
16 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 621, 624 (2001).  Follingstad measured observers’ 
perceptions of reasons why battered women remain in abusive relationships.  Id.  
Reasons for staying engender sympathy or understanding if the reasons are within 
the woman’s control.  Id.  The observer is less likely to blame the victim if her 
reasons are aligned with the observer’s own value system.  Id. 
 130. See Diane H. Coleman & Murray A. Straus, Marital Power, Conflict and 
Violence in a Nationally Representative Sample of American Couples, 1 VIOLENCE & 
VICTIMS 141, 148 (1986).  Coleman and Straus’ research found that male-
dominated relationships measured the most violence and the lowest level of 
consensus concerning the legitimacy of the power structure and the highest level 
of conflict over family responsibilities.  Id at 148-49. 
 131. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106. 
 132. See Philip G. Zimbardo et al., A Pirandellian Prison: The Mind is a Formidable 
Jailer, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 8, 1973, at 39. 
 133. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.; see also Dee L.R. Graham et al., A Scale for Identifying “Stockholm 
Syndrome” Reactions in Young Dating Women: Factor Structure, Reliability and Validity, 
10 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 3 (1995) (explaining how those in “hostage” relationships 
adapt). 
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esteem is repeated, eventually creating a strong affective bond from 
the low to high power person.”136  Concomitantly, the person in the 
high power position develops an inflated sense of his own power 
(just as the lower person develops an exaggerated sense of her 
powerlessness), which masks his dependency on the low person to 
transform his feeling of impotence into omnipotence.137 
 
 136. Dutton & Painter supra note 123, at 107; see also Cohen, supra note 71, at 
763.  Cohen describes tyrannous romantic relationships as the 
fully-matured version of the social, psychological, legal, and economic 
morass that the conditions of a tyrannical regime give onto are seldom, if 
ever, present at the inception of the relationship.  Nor are the conditions 
themselves.  (That is the experiential reason that it makes no sense to 
conceptualize these relationships as relationships of consent: the terms 
and conditions of the regime are not presented in an a priori manner, at 
the beginning or later, so that consent to them can be either granted or 
withheld).  Instead, these relationships tend to begin in the ways that 
ordinary, non-pathological relationships do—by means of the completely 
conventional, strongly traditional, independently unobjectionable 
elements of seduction we commonly accept as mating rituals.  Through 
the lens of later developments, some tendencies of these mating rituals 
appear unwholesomely exaggerated in relationships that devolve into 
tyrannies.  These tendencies also appear, once again, in hindsight, in 
relationships involving battering.  Perhaps the most prominent of these 
are strong, even extreme reactions of jealousy—not mere jealousy toward 
present rivals for the affections of the intended partner, but powerfully 
negative, deeply critical reactions toward a congeries of persons who may 
include the subjects of now-terminated romances; intimate, even close 
family members—notably, the children of pre-existent relationships, 
though later, the children of the tyrannical relationship itself usually get 
folded in; trusted colleagues who function as social intimates within 
employment situations; and some or even all friends.  As the relationship 
deepens, a staunch trade-off may come, with increasing persistence, to be 
insisted upon by the potential tyrant: In exchange for the suffusing 
warmth, passion, attentiveness, and unusual level of interest to which the 
suitor is working to accustom his intended mate, she will be required to 
loosen, perhaps even to sever her affective and supportive relationships 
with some number of others, perhaps with all of the others she was  close 
to before . . . .  One  such  reason  might  fall  under  the  rubric of the 
“lonely orphan” phenomenon.  Men who seem willing to give over 
extraordinary interest and attention to the object of their romantic 
desires sometimes arrive with stories in hand of the care and love that 
they themselves have never before received.  That is the cause, ostensible 
or real, of their powerful neediness, their demand for exclusive 
attachment.  To fall under the spell of these stories is to be empowered 
to be a love goddess and the redemptively good mother, at one and the 
same time.  That may be a difficult form of empowerment to resist, 
particularly when it comes wrapped in that which most of us want and 
some of us crave—offers of commitment bathed in oceans of love. 
Id. at 764-65. 
 137. ERICH FROMM, THE ANATOMY OF HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS 323 (1992); see 
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The omnipotence, however, is predicated on his ability to 
maintain absolute control in the dyadic relationship.138  When the 
symbiotic roles that maintain the relationship are disturbed, the 
dominator’s masked dependency on the subjugated person is 
revealed.139  In romantic relationships, as well as in cults, power 
imbalances magnify so that each person’s sense of power or 
powerlessness feeds on itself.140  In the process, both persons 
become welded together to maintain the psychological subsystem 
that fulfills the needs created, in part, by the power dynamic 
itself.141  In battering relationships, physical abuse can serve to 
maintain the power differential and, when coupled with emotional 
abuse including threats against the woman and her children and a 
generalized feeling of powerlessness felt by the victim, can serve to 
maintain the relationship homeostasis.142 
 
also Richard J.  Gelles, Abused Wives: Why Do They Stay?, 38 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 659 
(1976) (finding that feelings of powerlessness make a woman more likely to stay 
with her abuser). 
 138. FROMM, supra note 137, at 325.  Fromm describes the passion to have 
absolute and unrestricted control over a living being as sadism.  Id. at 322.  Fromm 
describes the sadistic character traits as never being understood in isolation from 
the whole character structure.  Sadism is part of a syndrome that has to be 
understood as a whole.  Id. at 325.  For the sadistic character everything living is to 
be controlled; living beings become things.  Id.  Their responses are forced by the 
one who controls them.  The sadist wants to become the master of life, and the 
quality of life should be maintained in his victim.  Id. 
 139. See id. at 236. 
 140. See id.;  see also Julia C. Babcock et al., Power and Violence: The Relationship 
Between Communication Patterns and Power Discrepancies, and Domestic Violence, 61 J. 
CONSULTING CLINICAL & PSYCHOL. 40 (1993) (concluding that husbands with less 
power were more physically abusive toward their wives). 
 141. FROMM, supra note 137, at 326.  Fromm finds the sadist is only stimulated 
by those who are helpless, never by those who are strong.  Id. at 325;  see also 
Eleanor A. Saunders & Jill A. Edelson, Attachment Style, Traumatic Bonding and 
Developing Rational Capacities in a Long Term Trauma Group for Women, 49 INT’L J. 
GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY 465 (1999) (describing the personality attributes of women 
in group therapy who are survivors of physical and sexual abuse).  The authors 
describe the women as “constructing successful social personae.”  Id. at 474.  
However, the women are also described as experiencing “strong feelings of 
defectiveness, helplessness, and self-loathing as well as intense fears about either 
damaging or being attacked by others if they were to risk expressing their true 
feelings or needs.”  Id. 
 142. See FROMM, supra note 137, at 325; see also Cohen, supra note 71, at 773.  
Cohen uses more extreme analysis of the tyrant in the relationship: 
A tyrant’s extreme need for control is often linked to outbursts of rage 
and to violence.  That is what brings partner-battering into the picture in 
tyrannical regimes.  When violence takes the form of repetitive battering, 
it appears to be the product of compulsion.  Not infrequently, the 
compulsion may itself be triggered by a severely heightened response to 
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In Dutton and Painter’s theory, traumatic bonding is also 
characterized by intermittent abuse.143  That is, “the dominator 
intermittently and periodically maltreats the dominated by threats, 
verbal and/or physical abuse.”144  The end of the abusive episode is 
marked by the onset of positive behaviors, which Walker 
characterizes as the contrition phase of the abuse cycle.145  The 
victim experiences periods of abusive treatment as well as periods 
of positive treatment associated with the end of the abusive 
incident.146  The alternating periods of abusive episodes and 
positive treatment represent a paradigm within learning theory.147  
The intermittent episodes of abuse and relief are highly effective in 
producing persistent patterns of behavior that are difficult to 
extinguish and develop strong emotional bonds.148 
The nuances of the intense emotional bond that an abused 
woman has for her batterer can be further explained by attachment 
theory.  John Bowlby explained attachment theory as both 
protective and instructive.149  He proposed that maintaining 
affectional bonds was essential to the survival of the human species, 
 
some small element of life that presents itself as outside the tyrant’s 
control.  The crying of a baby seems to operate as such a trigger.  A 
spouse or partner who breaks a “rule” of the household—by coming 
home late, for example, or making a noise that disturbs the tyrant’s 
sleep—may well be accused of provoking the ensuing attack.  But, some 
attacks are more patterned still.  Beatings may occur daily, sometimes at 
the same time of day.  The trigger for these actions seems purely internal 
and not a response to an external stimulus at all. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 143. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id.; WALKER, supra note 42, at 65. 
 146. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107. 
 147. Id.  Dutton labels the intermittent phases of alternative abusive behavior 
followed by positive treatment as intermittent reinforcement and punishment.  Id. 
 148. D.W. Rajecki, Successful Comparative Psychology: Four Case Histories, in 
COMPARING BEHAVIOR: STUDYING MAN STUDYING ANIMALS 67 (D. W. Rajecki ed. 
1983).  Rajecki reviewed emotional bonding in infants and assessed the major 
theories of infantile attachment, including those on both human and animal 
attachment.  Id. at 69.  One criterion for the comparative evaluation of his theories 
was their relative ability to explain “maltreatment effects.”  Id. at 76.  In reviewing 
the literature on maltreatment effects, Rajecki found conclusive evidence for 
enhanced infant animal attachment under conditions of intermittent 
maltreatment in birds, dogs, and monkeys.  Id. at 76-77.  Attempts to inhibit 
infants’ bonding to abusive attachment objects were found to inevitably fail unless: 
(1) they were persistent and consistently abusive, and (2) an alternate attachment 
object existed.  Id. 
 149. Paul R. Peluso et al., A Comparison of Attachment Theory and Individual 
Psychology: A Review of the Literature, 82 J. COUNSELING & DEV. 139, 139 (2004). 
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especially maintaining the bonds between a mother and her young 
child.150  The attachment relationships can be described as secure 
or insecure, and the quality of care an infant experiences can 
impact the quality of the attachment relationship.151  Ainsworth 
described four subgroups of attachment relationships—secure, 
avoidant, resistant, and disorganized.152  Infants who experienced 
abuse by a parent or caregiver who was emotionally unavailable 
manifested a disorganized attachment relationship.153  The abused 
child seeks proximity to the adult who is the source of the abuse 
and a figure of comfort and encounters an “irresolvable 
paradox.”154  The same paradox exists for the abused woman who 
sees her abuser as the source of her distress but also as “everything 
she ever wanted in a man.”155 
Dutton and Painter reviewed many studies to reach their 
conclusions about traumatic bonding.156  In analogizing the 
previously mentioned studies to explain the emotional bonding of 
battered women, “one feature that may weigh in favor of staying is 
the intermittent nature of the abuse . . . many (battered women) 
described highly pleasant periods of reconciliation between 
episodes . . . . This pattern was conducive to ignoring the problem 
or thinking of it as an aberrant, exceptional part of the 
relationship.”157  Dutton and Painter also discuss Walker’s cycle of 
violence theory to bolster their findings that “[t]he emotional 
aftermath of a battering incident for the batterer, usually guilt and 
contrition, leads him to attempt to make amends via exceptionally 
loving treatment toward his partner.”158  Thus, “his improved 
behavior serves to reduce the aversive arousal he himself created, 
while also providing reinforcement for his partner to stay in the 
relationship.”159 
The power imbalance and intermittent abuse elements of 
 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. David Shemmings, Research Relationships from an Attachment Perspective: The 
Use of Behavioural Interview, Self-Report and Projective Measures, 18 J. SOC. WORK PRAC. 
299, 301 (2004). 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. WALKER, supra note 42, at 68. 
 156. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107. 
 157. Id. at 108 (quoting Bruce J. Rousaville, Theories in Marital Violence: Evidence 
From a Study of Battered Women, 3 VICTIMOLOGY: AN INT’L J. 11, 17 (1978)). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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traumatic bonding explain why women do not leave abusive 
relationships and may use unconventional strategies to protect 
themselves or their children as they remain in the relationship.  
The periods of reconciliation give the impression to an abused 
woman that the partner will not continue to be abusive.  The 
dynamics are continually changing and the abused woman must 
constantly assess her partner for her safety and the safety of her 
children.  Courts do not recognize the strategies battered mothers 
employ as sufficient action in response to the violence inflicted.160 
Traumatic bonding cultivates a defense that can explain the 
tension a battered mother faces in a violent relationship.  She is 
emotionally bonded to a violent partner and she must balance 
those emotions against being a caretaker to her children and to 
herself.  Traumatic bonding explains the complexity of the choices 
a battered mother makes including her strategies.  Further, 
traumatic bonding contextualizes the duress defense with the idea 
that the battered mother lives in constant fear but she cannot easily 
sever the bond she has with her abuser.  The bond affects every 
choice she makes. 
B. Duress Defense 
The affirmative defense of duress operates on a self-defense 
construct.  However, the defendant does not act to protect herself.  
To the contrary, when the defendant commits a criminal offense, 
the defendant must be operating under the threat of death or great 
bodily harm by a co-defendant.161  The threat leads to the criminal 
act.  The duress defense seeks to explain the circumstances of 
acting with a co-defendant in committing a crime under a threat of 
violence.162  There are five elements to the general principle of the 
duress defense: (1) another person issued a specific threat to kill or 
grievously injure the defendant or a third party, particularly a near 
relative, unless he committed the offense; (2) the defendant 
reasonably believed that the threat was genuine; (3) the threat was 
present, imminent, and impending at the time of the criminal act; 
(4) there was no reasonable escape from the threat except through 
 
 160. See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA: ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
COURTS, CENTER FOR FAMILIES, CHILDREN & THE COURTS, PARENTING IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 15 (2003) available at 
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/cfcc/pdffiles/fullReport.pdf. 
 161. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985). 
 162. DRESSLER, supra note 106, at 273. 
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compliance with the demands of the coercer; and (5) the 
defendant was not at fault in exposing himself to the threat.163 
The Model Penal Code (MPC) version of duress is broader: 
(1) the defendant was compelled to commit the offense by the use, 
or threatened use, of unlawful force by the coercer upon the 
defendant; and (2) the defendant, a person of reasonable firmness 
in her situation, would have been unable to resist the coercion.164  
The MPC duress defense abandons the common law requirement 
that the defendant’s unlawful act be a response to an imminent 
deadly threat.165  Further, unlike the common law, the MPC does 
allow the use of duress as an affirmative defense against a murder 
charge.166 
A defense attorney can argue that the effect of traumatic 
bonding leaves an abused woman so compliant and helpless that 
her lack of action can be argued as the coercive effects of being in a 
long-term abusive relationship.  For example, Illinois statutes 
 
 163. Id. at 273-74; see also Burke, supra note 102, at 258 (finding that courts are 
reluctant to apply battered woman syndrome to duress cases because the 
syndrome describes subjective beliefs and is therefore irrelevant to whether the 
objective test under the duress defense has been met). 
 164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985); see also Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the 
Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1331, 1334 (1989) (arguing that the defense of duress lacks the moral authority to 
excuse the actions of defendants unless the defendants have “attained or reflected 
society’s legitimate expectations of moral strength”). 
 165. Dressler, supra note 164, at 1344. 
 166. Id. at 1374.  Dressler discusses the moral quagmire that a jury would face 
in case of a defendant asserting a duress defense to murder.  Id.  “A jury might 
rightly expect people to manifest the utmost moral strength—even at some point 
to choose death—when they have reason to know that they are playing a part even 
a minor role, in an especially barbaric scenario . . . .”  Id.  Cf. People. v. Pollock, 
780 N.E.2d 669 (Ill. 2002) (holding that evidence was insufficient to show that 
defendant mother knew that her boyfriend was harming his daughter).  In Pollock, 
the Illinois Supreme Court overturned the conviction of the defendant for first-
degree murder and aggravated battery of a child.  Id. at 689.  The defendant’s 
boyfriend was convicted of killing her two-year old daughter.  Id. at 678.  The 
defendant was found guilty of felony murder and aggravated battery of a child.  Id. 
at 680.  The trial court misstated the jury instruction by claiming the defendant 
“knew or should have known” that her boyfriend was abusing her child, and thus, 
imposed a negligent state of mind versus a knowing state of mind.  Id. at 681.  No 
allegations of abuse existed, but the case highlights how mothers are held 
accountable for the death of their children when their boyfriends commit the 
murders.  Id. at 684.  Duress would assist these women when they suffer the 
additional burden of an abusive relationship and losing their child.  See People v. 
Burton, 788 N.E.2d 220, 228 (Ill. 2003) (citing the Pollock decision in overturning 
the conviction of a mother who failed to intervene when her boyfriend killed her 
daughter). 
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recognize that defendants can be compelled to commit crimes 
against their will.167  The effect of being physically and emotionally 
abused becomes so pervasive that the woman is not only unable to 
defend herself; she also becomes an unwitting accomplice in the 
death of her own child.168 
An abused woman can attempt to explain her inaction under 
the duress defense, but courts are not necessarily sympathetic to 
such a defense.  In United States v. Webb, a battered woman charged 
with failure to protect unsuccessfully pled a duress defense.169  June 
Webb witnessed her husband kill their six-year old son, Steve, and 
bury his body in the desert.170  Keith Webb threatened to kill June 
Webb, her remaining children, and her family in Wilmington if she 
reported the crime.171  June Webb later revealed the murder to 
authorities.172 
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found that June 
 
 167. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/7-11 (1961).  Compulsion. 
(a)  A person is not guilty of an offense,  other  than  an  offense 
punishable with death, by reason of conduct which he performs under 
the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death 
or great bodily harm, if he reasonably believes death or great bodily harm 
will be inflicted upon him if he does not perform such conduct. 
 168. See State v. Lucero, 647 P.2d 406, 409 (N.M. 1982) (reinstating the child 
abuse conviction of a mother who testified that she did not seek help for her son 
or for herself for fear of further harm by her abusive boyfriend). 
 169. United States v. Webb, 747 F.2d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1984); see also Heather 
R. Skinazi, Comment, Not Just a “Conjured Afterthought”: Using Duress as a Defense for 
Battered Women Who “Fail to Protect,” 85 CAL. L. REV. 993, 1007 (1997) (discussing 
the implications of the Webb decision); Susan D. Appel, Note, Beyond Self Defense: 
The Use of Battered Woman Syndrome in Duress Defenses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 955 
(1994) (exploring the unwillingness of courts to recognize battered woman 
syndrome as a duress defense). 
 170. Webb, 747 F.2d at 281. 
 171. Id.  The jury found Webb guilty of failing to obtain medical care for Steve 
Webb.  Id. 
The Government was required to prove five elements: (1) that the victim 
was under the age of 14 years old, (2) that the defendant was the victim’s 
parent, and thus had a duty to provide the victim with medical care, (3) 
that the defendant engaged in conduct by omission that caused serious 
bodily injury to the victim by failing to provide medical care for the 
victim’s head injury (count 2) or scalding (count 3), (4) that the conduct 
occurred within the special territorial jurisdiction of the United States 
(for purposes of the Assimilative Crimes Act), and (5) that the defendant 
acted knowingly or intentionally. The trial essentially focused on whether 
Webb’s conduct was the product of duress or whether she acted 
knowingly or intentionally. 
Id. at 282 n.4. 
 172. Id. at 281. 
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Webb possessed no reasonable opportunity to escape the 
compulsion, it must find her not guilty.173  The jury heard no 
evidence explaining why a battered woman would not be able to 
leave.174  Undoubtedly, the jurors could not understand why June 
Webb was able to go to the authorities one month after Steve’s 
death, but not when Keith Webb was abusing Steve.  Without the 
benefit of a psychological explanation of why June Webb could not 
report the death of her son, the jury surmised that she was as 
culpable as her husband.175 
The mere presence of the mother makes her culpable for the 
abuse of the child.176  Courts find knowledge equals guilt for 
mothers.177  Additionally, courts do not easily accept introduction 
of the accused mother’s state of mind.  For example, a mother 
convicted of manslaughter and child neglect sought to introduce 
her meek demeanor with regard to her relationship with the 
boyfriend who killed her son.178  The court rejected such evidence 
finding it irrelevant and upheld the mother’s manslaughter 
 
 173. Id. at 285.  The district court gave the jury the following duress 
instruction: 
Duress. Duress may provide a legal excuse for the crime charged in the 
indictment. Duress is when a person commits an illegal act because she 
was compelled to do so by the threat of imminent death or serious bodily 
injury to herself or to another, such as one of her children.  In order for 
duress to provide a legal excuse for any criminal conduct, the 
compulsion must be present and immediate, and of such a nature as to 
induce a well-founded fear of impending death or serious bodily injury; 
and there must be no reasonable opportunity to escape the compulsion 
without committing the crime or participating in the commission of the 
crime. Acts done under such coercion or compulsion are not done 
willfully. If the evidence in the case leaves you with a reasonable doubt 
that the Defendant, at the time and place of the offense alleged in the 
indictment, acted or failed to act willfully and voluntarily, and not as a result 
of coercion, compulsion or duress, as just explained, then it is your duty to 
find the Defendant not guilty. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. Id.  The court interpreted the Texas Penal Code to require that conduct 
must be voluntary.  When a defendant raises the defensive theory that the criminal 
conduct involved was the product of duress or compulsion, the court interpreted 
the Texas statute to require that the threats reach the level of compulsion. TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.05(e) (2003).  “It is no defense that a person acted at the 
command or persuasion of his spouse, unless he acted under compulsion that 
would establish a defense under this section.”  Id. 
 175. Webb, 747 F.2d at 281. 
 176. See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982). 
 177. See infra Parts VII, VIII (discussing failure to protect laws and the strict 
liability standard, respectively). 
 178. State v. Smith, 408 N.E.2d 614, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). 
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conviction.179 
Webb and other cases present a challenging question: “[W]hy 
has domestic violence so rarely, and so unsuccessfully, been made 
an explicit part of representing victims in these cases?”180  Framing 
the core issue of domestic violence with the challenge of mothers 
who are charged with victimizing their children leaves courts in a 
conundrum.  “Punishing someone who commits a criminal act in 
the throes of their own victimization offends our sense of justice, 
particularly if the punishment arises out of a crime by the person 
who is victimizing her.”181  However, courts convict the victimized. 
Webb exemplifies the difficulty in using a duress defense alone 
to countermand the legal duty a mother has to protect her 
children—no matter what the circumstance the mothers face.  
Courts have convicted mothers who suffer domestic violence as 
equal or lesser parties in child abuse and child homicide cases.182 
V. DURESS DEFENSE AND BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 
Duress is a difficult defense to launch, especially when a 
defendant seeks extralegal explanations for her culpability.183  
Courts exercise a strict normative interpretation of how duress can 
be utilized to explain a defendant’s behavior.184  Historically, 
defendants have sought to use duress and coercion in a myriad of 
approaches, including a World War II Japanese radio personality 
who pled coercion to charges of being used as an instrument of 
psychological warfare,185 convicted kidnappers claiming threats 
coerced their participation,186 and discharged police officers who 
claimed they resigned under duress.187 
Present day courts do not give leeway to duress being used to 
introduce battered woman syndrome.188  The Eleventh Circuit 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Evan Stark, A Failure to Protect: Unraveling “The Battered Mother’s Dilemma,” 
27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 37 (2000). 
 181. Id. at 37-38. 
 182. See supra Part IV; see infra Part VI. 
 183. See Skinazi, supra note 169; see also Kelly Grace Monacella, Comment, 
Supporting a Defense of Duress: The Admissibility of Battered Woman Syndrome, 70 TEMP. 
L. REV. 699 (1997) (analyzing the use of battered women’s syndrome to support 
the defense of duress). 
 184. Monacella, supra note 183, at 45-46. 
 185. D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951). 
 186. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935). 
 187. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
 188. See Monacella, supra note 183, at 714-20; see also United States v. Willis, 38 
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Court of Appeals rejected the use of expert testimony to explain 
battered woman syndrome.189  The defendant, Evelyn Ellis, used the 
duress defense to explain that her husband induced fear, anxiety, 
and fierce discomfort.190  The lower court noted that Ms. Ellis was 
her husband’s “slave.”191  Mr. Ellis murdered his first wife and 
brutalized Ms. Ellis.  However, the circuit court rejected any threat 
that was not immediate in nature that could not be used as 
evidence to introduce battered woman syndrome.192  The court’s 
rationale was a “generalized fear of persecution from her 
husband . . . does not allow her to escape the consequences . . . .”193  
The court also noted that Ms. Ellis had the opportunity to flee or 
contact law enforcement about her husband.194 
The everyday reality of Ms. Ellis’s life, and what the courts 
expect from battered women, portrays a gap in reality that few 
courts have addressed.  The Eleventh Circuit expected Ms. Ellis to 
risk her life and the lives of her family195 to report her husband’s 
criminal activity, a man who had killed his previous wife.  Battered 
women who have partners that engage in criminal activity have 
little recourse but to be considered criminals themselves.  However, 
some courts have reviewed the use of battered woman syndrome as 
a pliable defense.196 
Lisa Dunn explained to her jail chaplain that her boyfriend, 
Daniel Remeta, threatened her with a gun, choked her, and 
repeatedly threatened to kill her family.197  Daniel Remeta started a 
murderous crime spree that spread across Kansas.198  The court 
convicted Lisa Dunn of aiding and abetting in murder, kidnapping, 
 
F.3d 170 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding evidence of battered woman syndrome irrelevant 
in duress claim because it only related to the defendant’s subjective weakened 
mental state). 
 189. United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (11th 
Cir. 1991).  The United States seized Ms. Ellis’ acreage after the court found her 
guilty of drug trafficking.  Id. at 859. 
 190. Id. at 860. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 861. 
 195. Hubert Ellis threatened Evelyn Ellis’ mother and had the mother sign 
over the property that the U.S. government seized.  Ms. Ellis’ daughters from a 
previous relationship called Hubert Ellis the devil.  Id. at 860. 
 196. Monacella, supra note 183, at 711-17 (offering analysis of cases that have 
recognized the admissibility of battered woman syndrome evidence). 
 197. Dunn v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308, 310 (10th Cir. 1992). 
 198. Id. 
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and aggravated battery.199  The trial court refused to grant expert 
funds for a psychiatrist.200  The appellate court granted Lisa Dunn’s 
habeas petition not to raise a duress claim, but to negate the 
element of specific intent based on Lisa Dunn’s state of mind.201  
Appellate courts have expressed sympathy to battered women who 
the state charges as coconspirators, but the courts have granted 
limited use of battered woman syndrome in duress cases.202  Many 
cases never reach the purview of appellate courts. 
The Sixty Acres court addressed the crux of the problem courts 
have with introducing battered woman syndrome into a duress 
defense: a generalized fear does not substitute for an immediate 
threat of death or great bodily harm.203  Marrying a duress defense 
with traumatic bonding would give the courts a greater 
understanding of why women stay with violent and criminal 
partners.  Courts were initially reluctant to accept battered woman 
syndrome to explain why the immediacy requirement in self-
defense cases had to be scrutinized in a different fashion.204  Courts 
adopted a subjective viewpoint of the defendants and allowed 
“imperfect” self-defense cases.205  The same viewpoint is needed in 
duress cases.  If the trier of fact determines the subjective viewpoint 
of defendants who claim duress incorrect, then the defendant 
should be allowed an “imperfect duress” defense. 
A perfect duress defense claims the defendant was compelled 
to commit the crime under threat and was unable to resist the 
coercion.206  If objective and subjective requirements are met, the 
defendant would be exonerated.  In other words, if the threat 
 
 199. Id. at 309-10. 
 200. Id. at 310-11. 
 201. Id. at 313. 
 202. See Monacella, supra note 183, at 726; see also United States v. Brown, 891 
F. Supp. 1501 (D. Kan. 1995) (granting the defendant’s motion for a new trial 
based on new evidence of Ruby Brown being a battered woman at the time of the 
offenses). 
 203. United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 930 F.2d 857, 860 (11th 
Cir. 1991). 
 204. See supra Part II. 
 205. See supra Part II. 
 206. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985); see also BETH RICHIE, COMPELLED 
TO CRIME: THE GENDER ENTRAPMENT OF BATTERED BLACK WOMEN (1996).  Richie 
explores gender entrapment to illuminate “the contradictions and complications 
of the lives of African American battered women who commit crimes by 
explaining the link between culturally constructed gender-identity development, 
violence against woman in intimate relationships, and women’s participation in 
illegal activities.”  Id. at 4. 
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under an objective analysis was such that the defendant had no 
choice but to commit the crime, and subjectively, the defendant 
could not resist the coercive effect of the threat, the elements are 
satisfied.  If the objective or subjective requirements are not met 
(imperfect duress), then the defendant would be guilty of a lesser 
offense. 
Introducing the emotional bonds battered woman have to 
their partners would assist courts in understanding that a 
generalized fear has the same coercive effect of an immediate 
threat.  Traumatic paralysis seeks to create the nexus between a 
generalized threat and a specific and immediate threat.  Each type 
of threat has the same coercive effect upon a battered woman. 
VI.   FAILURE TO PROTECT LAWS 
A. Background 
While courts have determined that the primary responsibility 
of the child falls upon both parents, mothers are singled out as the 
primary care takers, and take primary blame when tragedy strikes.  
Blaming mothers began with the development of the child welfare 
system and the creation of failure to protect laws in the Progressive 
era.207  White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) reformers’ fears of 
depravity, poverty, and violence among urban and immigrant 
communities led to intervention in individual families.208  The 
reformers did not address economic and environmental causes of 
poverty.209  They sought state intervention.  Courts fined and jailed 
parents and removed children from their homes.210 
Mothers bore the brunt of the courts’ ire.  The Society for the 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children (SPCC) imposed middle class 
standards on poor urban women.211  A mother who worked outside 
of the home had her children removed.212  The same woman 
suffered physical abuse from her husband, but the court ignored 
the claim.213  The attitude of courts towards battered mothers has 
 
 207. Renee Goldsmith Kasinsky, Child Neglect and Unfit Mothers: Child Savers in 
the Progressive Era and Today, 6 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 97, 99-105 (1994). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 100. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 103-04. 
 212. Id. at 104. 
 213. Id.  Kasinsky details a 1922 neglect hearing where a mother was blamed 
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not changed. 
The majority of states have criminal child abuse legislation.  
Thirty-eight states have statutes that include omissions of a duty to 
protect in their lists of prohibited behaviors.214  The remaining 
twelve states have “commission statutes” that punish only willful 
and intentional conduct of those persons who actually commit 
abuse.215  In every state, “parents have an affirmative legal duty to 
protect and provide for their minors.”216  The state intercedes when 
the parent fails in his or her duty.217 
State intervention does not take into account the history of the 
battered woman.  The state will investigate and determine whether 
to remove the child but will not address the underlying abuse that 
is pervasive in the family.218  The battered mother is twice 
victimized: by her abuser, and then by being labeled a bad mother 
by the State.219 
Battered women are on the lowest rung of society and the legal 
community.  Women must exist in a society that imposes unrealistic 
standards of motherhood but fails to protect women from the most 
intimate arenas of violence.220  The unjust legal standards applied 
to failure to protect laws further erode the diminished status of 
battered mothers.  In the Nicholson cases, the State of New York 
imposed unjust and unrealistic standards on battered mothers who 
then became victimized twice: once by the batterer, and then by the 
state.221 
Abused mothers and their children filed a class action suit 
against the City of New York for removing the children because the 
 
for leaving her ten and twelve year old sons alone in the home while she worked as 
a domestic.  Id.  The court removed two of her six children.  Id.  The father was 
not held accountable.  Id.  The mother raised domestic violence in the home, but 
the court would only discuss the neglect allegations.  Id. 
 214. Enos, supra note 24, at 236. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Appell, supra note 31, at 587-88. 
 219. See id. at 588.  Appell argues that the state uses laws intended to protect 
mothers and children from their abusers to remove children from their 
nonabusive mothers.  Id. 
 220. See Melner, supra note 24, at 304.  Melner finds mothers’ rights are being 
undermined by courts which may misevaluate the best interests of the children.  
Id.  This occurs when courts misperceive battered mothers to be unfit based 
largely on myths and regard affirmative acts taken by the mother to protect her 
children as passivity and thus a failure to protect.  Id. 
 221. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
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mothers suffered domestic violence.222  The mothers argued that 
the Administration of Child Services (ACS) violated their liberty 
interest by removing their children without a hearing, an order, or 
filed petition.223  The New York court found ACS rarely held the 
batterers accountable, did not offer adequate services to the 
mother before removing their children, and separated battered 
mothers and children unnecessarily.224  The court granted the 
mothers injunctive relief.225 
Nicholson portrays the dangers of inferred blame that battered 
mothers shoulder while being victims.  Child protection services in 
New York created the legal standard of presumptive guilt.  Legal 
standards need to address the reality that battered mothers and 
children face. 
Child abuse is endemic.  More than one million children are 
abused and neglected every year.226  The National Child Abuse and 
 
 222. Id.  On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit directed the 
New York Court of Appeals to harmonize the “best interests” test with the calculus 
concerning “imminent risk” and “imminent danger” to “life or health.”  Nicholson 
v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 169 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 223. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 164-65.  An ACS supervisor ordered a worker 
to remove a new born baby from her mother after it was determined the father of 
the child and the alleged abuser was paying the rent on the mother’s apartment.  
Id. at 181.  The baby was determined to be in “imminent danger,” because the 
mother was economically dependent upon the father of the child.  Id.  ACS 
coerced the mother into parenting and domestic violence classes before they 
would return her baby.  Id. 
 224. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 843 (N.Y. 2004). 
 225. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d at 260.  In subsequent appellate proceedings, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified three questions 
to the New York Court of Appeals: 
1) Does the definition of a neglected child include instances in which the 
sole allegation of neglect is a person legally responsible for the child  
allowing the child to witness domestic violence?; 2) Can injury result 
from a child witnessing domestic violence against a caretaker rise to risk 
or danger to the child’s life?; and 3) Does the child witnessing abuse 
suffice to demonstrate “removal is necessary” or must the protective 
agency offer more particularized evidence to justify removal? 
Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 344 F.3d 154, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2003).  The Court of 
Appeals answered: 
1) a party seeking to establish neglect must, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, show physical or mental impairment, imminent danger, and 
actual or threatened harm is a consequence of a parent/guardian’s 
minimum degree of care; 2) exposing a child to domestic violence is not 
presumptively neglectful; and 3) there can be no “blanket presumption” 
favoring removal when a child witnesses domestic violence. 
Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d at 844, 847, 854. 
 226. See ANDREA J. SEDAK & DIANE D. BROADHURST, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE THIRD NATIONAL 
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Neglect Data System (NCANDS) reported an estimated 1400 child 
fatalities in 2002.227  Physical abuse by fathers and other male 
caretakers cause most child fatalities.228  However, society’s response 
to the murder of a child is to punish the mother who lost her child. 
Many states prosecute parents for the failure to protect a child 
against abuse and neglect.229  These omission statutes punish not 
the abuser, but the parent or caretaker who failed to fulfill her or 
his duty to protect the child.  Nevertheless, the societal paradigm of 
the bad mother is what empowers these laws.230  Being a “good 
mother” requires women to place themselves outside the domain of 
self-concern.231 
Consequently, a woman who constructs a life independent 
from that of her children or from the father or husband 
does not conform to socially accepted notions of 
mothering or of motherhood.  Battered women, then, 
who struggle for individual survival, as well as for the 
survival of their children, are bad mothers and 
transformed into cultural pariahs . . . . Mothers are 
responsible for harms to children—harms that they had 
no hand in creating.  In many states, mothers are 
responsible even when they are the targets of intra-familial 
violence and not the perpetrators of such violence.232 
 
INCIDENT STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (1996), available at 
http://nccanch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/statsinfo/nis3.cfm. 
 227. See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFORMATION, 
(2004), available at http://nccanch.act.hhs.gov/pubs/factsheets/fatality/cfm. 
 228. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/children.htm 
#kidsrel. 
 229. Bryan Liang & Wendy McFarlane, Murder by Omission: Child Abuse and the 
Passive Parent, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 397, 409 n.100 (1999) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 13-604.01, 13-1105(a)(2), 13-3619, 13-3623 (West 1997); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 273A (West 1997); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-6-401 to 401.2 (1997); D.C. CODE ANN. 
§§ 22-901 to -902 (1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 827.03-.071 (West 1997); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-4.3, 115/53, 150/4 (West 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
265, § 13J (West 1997); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 750.135, 750.136b (West 1997); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-3 (West 1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.10 (McKinney 1997); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.22 (West 1997); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.04 to 
.041 (Vernon 1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 63.1-248.1 to -248.17 (Michie 1997); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.16.100, 9A.42.010 to .030 (West 1997)). 
 230. Ahearn et al., supra note 9, at 858. 
 231. See Neal, supra note 8, at 64. 
 232. Miccio, supra note 17, at 93 (citing In re Melissa U., 148 A.D.2d 862 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1989)); see also Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: 
The Error of Pursing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565 (2004) 
(arguing it is wrong to charge battered mothers with abuse or neglect when their 
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“In 2002, women experienced an estimated 494,570 rape, 
sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault and simple assault 
victimizations at the hands of an intimate.”233  “Intimate violence is 
primarily a crime against women–in 1998, females were the victims 
in 72% of intimate murders and the victims of about 85% of non-
lethal intimate violence.”234  In the year 2000, intimates murdered 
1247 women.235  Women and children are equally vulnerable to 
violence, yet the laws do not reflect such realities. 
B.  State v. Sarah Snodie 
My son was being beat on and I was being beat on.  I 
almost came to Judge Malloy [of the Kenosha County 
Family Court].  It was in November.  I seen her outside 
and I sat there while she was talking to people and I was 
going to tell her what was going on, but I was afraid of 
what she’d do.  I was afraid of her taking my kids away and 
locking me up for what happened, because Donnell 
always said they would never believe you because they 
never believed you before.  So I tried to do it my own way 
and I tried to wait him out until February 5th.  He was 
going to jail in Waukegan, so I thought I could outwait 
him, but I couldn’t and I tried to leave with the kids that 
Saturday night and he caught me.  He bit me on my arm 
and I was already bitten two other times and he sat there 
and beat on me and he put me in a scalding hot shower.  I 
 
children witness domestic violence).  Dunlap lists reasons why holding abused 
mothers accountable for actions the state finds equally culpable as the abuser as 
unfair: 
1) a failure-to-protect charge presumes that the mother has not taken 
concrete effective steps to protect her children; 2) although witnessing 
domestic violence can harm children, not all are harmed to a degree that 
warrants the coercive intervention of the child protection system; 3) 
failure-to-protect charges may actually enhance the likelihood of harm in 
several ways; 4) if women decline to seek help for fear of losing their 
children, more battering may occur; 5) failure-to-protect charges 
emotionally abuse the victim by replicating the coercive, authoritarian 
behavior she experienced at the hands of the batterer; and 6) failure-to-
protect charges, even if otherwise justifiable, are likely to be ineffectual. 
Id. at 573-75. 
 233. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS , U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND VICTIMS 
STATISTICS, CRIME CHARACTERISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
cvict_c.htm. 
 234. Id. 
 235. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTARY 
HOMICIDE REPORTS (1976-2000). 
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promised him I would not try to leave him ever again and 
he promised to go to domestic violence counseling and go 
to all this counseling and stuff, and I agreed to it but I was 
planning on going to Social Services and asking if my 
children could be sent up north, Waupaca, where they’d 
be safe. 
I guess I didn’t spell it out for anybody, but I asked all 
the time for my children’s safety.  I allowed Donnell to 
beat on me.  I told him to beat on me instead of my baby.  
One time Drake scraped a fork against his teeth and I said 
please don’t hit him, hit me instead.  I taught [Donnell] 
to be that way. 236 
Sarah Snodie described, in chilling detail, the months of her 
life leading up to the death of her son, Drake London.  Sarah lived 
in a constant state of fear and intimidation caused by her live-in 
boyfriend, Donnell McKennie.237  She expressed the frustration she 
faced in seeking help for her children as well as herself.238  
McKennie knew that if Sarah sought help, her credibility would be 
questioned by the very apparatus that was meant to assist women in 
crisis.239  Ironically, the District Attorney of Kenosha County, Robert 
Jambois, expressed the same cynicism as Sarah Snodie about the 
weaknesses existing in the system.240  During Sarah Snodie’s 
sentencing Jambois vociferously denied that Donnell McKennie 
battered Sarah Snodie, stating: 
Sarah Snodie has never told the truth, the full truth about 
what happened to Drake London the final weeks of his 
life.  I don’t expect that she’ll tell the truth now. When 
she talked to me, I don’t believe that she told the full 
truth about what’s happened in this case.  I don’t even 
know if Sarah can even remember the full truth at this 
 
 236. Transcript of Sentencing at 84-85, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. 
Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1997). 
 237. Id.; see also Dave Cole, Defense Lawyer Wants Gag Order on Abuse Case, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 28, 1997, at 3. 
 238. See generally Jeanne A. Fugate, Note, Who’s Failing Whom? A Critical Look at 
Failure to Protect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 290-91 (2001) (discussing the various 
difficulties, stereotypes, and obstacles battered women face in obtaining legal help 
through the court system). 
 239. See generally id. (explaining that courts assume women can leave their 
abusers and expect them to sacrifice their own safety for their children’s; 
discussing one case where the court “snidely” dismissed the mother’s fear of her 
husband, even though she knew he had murdered at least two other women). 
 240. See Transcript of Sentencing at 16-17, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. 
Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 1997). 
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point because she told so many different statements as to 
what occurred.  She’s given so many different variations. 
Donnell McKennie is the person who murdered Drake 
London, but Sarah Snodie was right there with him every 
step of the way and she was the child’s mother. Even if 
there was some measure of truth to what is being said by 
the people who were advancing domestic violence as a 
defense in this case, even if there was some measure of 
truth to that defense, some sliver of truth, don’t we expect 
more than from the mothers of this community, from the 
parents of this community?  Wouldn’t we expect more on 
behalf of Drake London than that which was provided to 
him by his mother?  Even a mother who’s being physically 
abused by a boyfriend or a husband, wouldn’t we expect a 
mother under those circumstances to do something more 
than turn her head away when her infant son turns 
pleading eyes toward her looking for some refuge from 
the terrible violence that this child experienced?241 
Jambois articulated the legal standard to which all mothers 
who fail to protect their children are held: the legally objective 
reasonable self-sacrificing mother.  Any mother who falls below the 
bright-line test is prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.242 
C. Legal Standards 
Battered mothers are as much at risk for death or great bodily 
harm as their children.  However, courts do not address the 
dilemmas mothers face on a daily basis in living with a violent 
partner.  The battered mother is placed in the legal juxtaposition 
of choosing between the lesser of two evils: risking her life and the 
lives of her children by remaining in a violent relationship or 
having the state intervene and risk having her parental rights 
terminated.243 
Failure to protect laws place the interest of the child against 
that of the mother instead of seeking to find a solution that would 
 
 241. Id. 
 242. Fugate, supra note 238, at 290-91 (“Courts demand that women, in 
contrast to men must sacrifice their safety, including standing up to the men who 
beat them, in order to save their children and fulfill their ‘maternal instinct.’”).  
Fugate finds mothers are expected to “be all-knowing when it comes to their 
children and as a result face harsher scrutiny and are more likely to be blamed if 
anything goes wrong.”  Id. at 294. 
 243. See WALKER, supra note 54, at 34-35, 60. 
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create a safe environment for the mother as well as the child.244  
The battered mother is placed in the dichotomous sphere where 
her survival is opposed to that of her children.  She must place 
herself in harm’s way to protect her children and have no regard 
for her safety and wellbeing.  “Battered women then, who struggle 
for individual survival, as well as for the survival of their children 
are bad mothers and transformed into cultural pariahs.”245  The 
courts accept nothing less than complete sacrifice, and the legal 
standards regard anything less as a prima facie case for termination 
of parental rights.246 
The legal standards in failure to protect provisions construct 
an essentialist view of motherhood that the mother must be self-
sacrificing no matter how violent the partner, or what dangers she 
may encounter.  If she is not self-sacrificing, she must yield her 
children to the child welfare system.  Courts applying the objective 
standard use domestic violence a mother suffers as a “sword to 
sever the mother-child relationship.”247  The strict liability standard 
measures maternal harm rather than maternal conduct.248  The 
courts measure the harm inflicted on the child by the abuser and 
the mother as being equal.249  Each standard fails to take into 
account the stratagem battered mothers utilize as a subordinate in 
a relationship epitomized by violence and domination.  A 
subjective legal standard transcends legally imposed norms of 
motherhood and allows the battered mother leeway to establish her 
mens rea. 
1. Objective 
The facially neutral failure to protect laws do have different 
outcomes when applied to women who are unable to meet the 
legally objective standard set in most courts.250  Battered women do 
 
 244. See Ahearn et al., supra note 9, at 855-56 (stating that child protection 
agencies often remove children from situations of domestic violence without first 
creating a safety plan for the mother and children or require mothers to seek 
services “which may not be safe or available options in a particular case”). 
 245. Miccio, supra note 17, at 93. 
 246. Fugate, supra note 238, at 290-91. 
 247. Miccio, supra note 17, at 93. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See Melner, supra note 24, at 316 (stating courts often fail “to give 
adequate consideration to rational, affirmative responses battered women might 
take to protect their children”). 
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not think like the reasonable non-battered woman.  The “New York 
Family Court articulated an objective standard in finding a battered 
mother abusive because she failed to stop the stepfather from 
engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with her daughter,” 
holding “that a reasonable, prudent parent would have both known 
of the abuse and stopped such conduct.”251 
The mother is expected to become a supernatural parent who 
overcomes the abuse she suffers, and she must also intervene to 
save her child.  The Katherine C. court recognized the abuse the 
mother suffered, including being held at knifepoint by her 
husband.252  In spite of this, the court insisted that, because the 
mother did not file for an order of protection, “such an omission 
evinced an inability to protect.”253  Additionally, “the court 
insinuated that her failure to file for an order of protection vitiated 
the existence of violence, its severity and its consequences.”254  G. 
Karen Miccio summarizes the tragedy of the judiciary attempting to 
apply the objective standard to battered women: 
The position taken by the court then underscores judicial 
inability to adequately account for and assess the nature 
and scope of domestic violence, particularly when 
maternal conduct is compared with that of the reasonable 
parent. The yardstick that measures maternal conduct is 
inappropriate because the objective test filters out 
violence.  Within the context of child abuse such de-
formation can have deadly and far-reaching 
consequences.255 
2. Strict Liability 
As stated previously, all fifty states have parental duty-to-protect 
statutes.256  Most states, however, have “strict liability omissions 
 
 251. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 111 (citing In re Katherine C., 122 Misc. 2d 
276 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984)). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id.; see also In re A.D.R., 542 N.E.2d 487, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (finding 
battered mother liable using the objective test where there was no evidence of 
direct abuse of the child); In re Michael M., 591 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685 (Fam. Ct. 1992) 
(holding that children were neglected due to exposure to domestic violence 
where their father abused their mother, and determining that the children were at 
substantial risk of impairment, according to the expert testimony of a 
psychologist). 
 255. Miccio, supra note 17, at 112. 
 256. Enos, supra note 24, at 237. 
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statutes that require only a showing that the guardian held a duty 
to care or protection and that the duty was violated through 
inaction.”257  Therefore, “the majority of omission statutes do not 
require a showing of an affirmative act of neglect or malevolent 
intent.”258  The de jure application of the failure to protect laws gives 
no affirmative leeway for the battered woman to defend herself.259 
Karen Dalton had her parental rights terminated after her 
husband prostituted her, physically and sexually assaulted her, and 
persistently threatened to kill her.260  Lawrence Dalton terrorized 
his children with physical abuse as well.261  Karen Dalton attempted 
to flee Lawrence only to be met with threats to abduct and kill their 
children.262  In upholding the order of termination, the Illinois 
court determined Karen Dalton failed to protect her children no 
matter what efforts she had pursued.263  Karen Dalton failed; 
therefore, she no longer had the right to be a mother. 
The strict liability standard gives no leeway to examine the 
tactics or strategies battered mothers use to survive their ordeal or 
protect their children.  Mothers who suffer domestic violence are 
often considered unfit to parent, and courts have terminated their 
parental rights.264  A mother who successfully completed her 
parenting classes still had her rights terminated because she 
continued in abusive relationships.265  A mother who filed orders of 
protection against her abuser had her parental rights terminated, 
because she continued the relationship.266  A new legal standard is 
needed to address the needs of battered mothers when the state 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See Melner, supra note 24, at 318 (“[C]ourts often recognize the [spousal] 
abuse, yet fail to recognize its significance leading to the woman’s mental and 
physical paralysis as well as her inability, despite her best efforts under the 
circumstances, to provide a stable environment for her children or to protect 
them from physical abuse.”). 
 260. In re Dalton, 424 N.E.2d 1226, 1228-29 (Ill. 1981). 
 261. Id. at 1229. 
 262. Id. at 1230. 
 263. Id. at 1232. 
 264. See In re Janine M.A., 796 N.E.2d 1175, 1182-83 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); see also 
Leigh Goodmark, The Legal Response to Domestic Violence: Problems and Possibilities: 
Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That For Sure? Questioning the Efficacy of Legal 
Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 27 (2004) 
(“[B]attered women are finding that when they become involved with the child 
protection system, they are viewed as mothers who have failed their children by 
being abused and are suffering the consequences.”). 
 265. In re C.W., 766 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. 2002). 
 266. State ex rel. C.J.K., 774 So. 2d 107 (La. 2000). 
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prosecutes them and terminates their parental rights. 
3. Subjective 
The introduction of the subjective standard in failure to 
protect prosecutions would allow the battered woman to address 
her mens rea, or lack thereof, during the abuse.267  The affirmative 
defense of traumatic paralysis sanctions the mother to explain her 
perceived inaction.268  Confronted by the legal construct of an 
objective or strict liability standard, the battered woman faces an 
insurmountable task.  The battered woman’s perception of 
protecting her child against abuse will not withstand the legal 
scrutiny of the rational reasonable mother.269 
A de facto application of failure to protect laws would recognize 
the battered woman’s endeavor to save her child’s life.  In State v. 
McKennie, the criminal complaint describes Sarah Snodie’s 
attempts to protect her son: 
The defendant spanked Drake London very hard at least 
twice, causing Drake to cry.  The defendant continued to 
hit him and hit him so many times that Sarah lost count.  
She states she walked away because she was afraid to look 
in Drake’s eyes as he was [sic] was asking for help. She 
further stated that the defendant had hit her in the past 
and that it hurt when the defendant hits her and that the 
defendant hit Drake as hard as the defendant hit her in 
the past. She further stated that she did see all of the 
hitting since she walked away and went into the bedroom 
while they were in the living room. She further states that 
while in the bedroom she heard the defendant shoving 
Drake’s head into the corner and that the defendant 
always does that to Drake when he gets mad. She states 
that the defendant came into the bedroom and they had 
sex, but that after having sex, the defendant again went to 
Drake, who was in the bathroom and brought him into 
 
 267. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 650 (explaining that a subjective standard of 
reasonable behavior would allow a battered mother to argue she reasonably 
believed “further intervention would create the risk of death or serious injury”). 
 268. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 119 (stating the “reasonable battered mother” 
standard proposed by the author “permits inquiry into how environment 
constructs maternal choices to control and minimize harm to herself and her 
child”). 
 269. See id.; Melner, supra note 24, at 325 (arguing for a rationality standard 
that would allow courts to take into consideration affirmative acts by the mother to 
protect her child). 
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the living room. She states that the defendant was mad 
because Drake would not talk to him, and that the 
defendant put a salt chili powder product into Drake’s 
mouth, telling him it would make Drake talk. The 
defendant gave Drake almost the entire package of 
powder. Snodie states that her mother came over about 
noon, but the defendant stayed in the bedroom with 
Drake, and that she believes that Donnell was keeping 
Drake in there so that her mother would not see the 
marks on Drake’s butt. She further states that after her 
mother left, the defendant was very mad because Drake 
had punched Donnell in the nose and had spilled a cup 
of water. She states that she and the defendant then had 
sex again, because she figured it would keep Donnell 
from beating on Drake, but while they were having sex the 
defendant stopped and took Drake into the living room 
out of her sight where she could hear Drake crying and 
could hear Donnell pushing Drake’s head into the corner 
again. She states after a few minutes the defendant came 
back and they finished having sex.270 
A subjective legal standard is necessary to countermand the 
inherent prejudice that a mother like Sarah Snodie faces in the 
legal system.271  She attempted to use sex to placate a violent and 
highly sexual abusive partner, but her efforts were no longer 
sufficient to protect Drake.272  Donnell McKennie engaged in 
sexual intercourse with Sarah while in the midst of causing the 
death of Drake London.273  An objective or strict liability standard 
condemns Sarah Snodie.  A subjective standard seeks to 
understand Sarah’s deportment, and her attempt to protect Drake 
the only way she could, amidst such horror.  Dr. Kevin Fullin, a 
domestic violence expert, testified at Sarah Snodie’s sentencing.  
Dr. Fullin described Sarah’s plight, “if you can imagine being 
 
 270. Criminal Complaint at 4, State v.  McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 21, 1997). 
 271. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 107. 
 272. Carol Apt & David Farley Hulbert, The Sexuality of Women in Physically 
Abusive Marriages: A Comparative Study, 8 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 57 (1993). The authors 
compared female sexuality in abusive and non-abusive marriages.  The abused 
married women reported lower levels of intimacy and compatibility and greater 
sexual dissatisfaction. However, they reported higher frequency of sexual 
intercourse.  The authors theorize that the abused wife must submit to the sexual 
demands of her husband.  Id. at 64-65. 
 273. Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 21, 1997). 
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raped, there is no good response to that level of control coercion 
and violence . . . no matter what response you take it’s going to 
result in more violence.”274 
D. Practical Application of Subjective Standard 
The courts can use the subjective legal standard for failure to 
protect cases to assist battered mothers who would have no defense 
under standards such as strict liability.275  Battered mothers should 
be given the opportunity to rebut the presumptions of being a bad 
mother.276  The subjective standard should not be allowed for all 
mothers charged in failure to protect cases.  Battered mothers are a 
distinct class that do not abuse their children but are held to 
standards similar to abusers.277 
The subjective standard would allow the mother to offer an 
affirmative defense to state allegations of abuse.  Statutory 
construction would allow an evidentiary standard of either 
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing evidence 
that the battered mother was indeed battered.278  Once the mother 
has met the prima facie battered standard, the State would then 
allow the mother to construct a subjective defense that seeks to 
explain the State’s allegations of inactivity or failure to intercede by 
the mother. 
Battered mothers are held to a higher standard of scrutiny by 
the State for being in abusive relationships and exposing their 
children to violence.279  These mothers need a legal standard that 
addresses the presumptions inherent in the child welfare system 
 
 274. Transcript of Sentencing, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 21, 1997). 
 275. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 108, 110-11. 
 276. See State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145 (Wis. 1986). The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court found that because the mother knowingly allowed her spouse to 
repeatedly abuse her children physically and sexually, it fell within the statutory 
construction of child abuse.  Id. at 147.  The court reasoned that although a 
person was generally under no duty to protect another from hazardous situations, 
the parent was under a duty to protect her children.  Id. at 151.  Wisconsin law 
required professionals to report suspected child abuse and did not relieve parents 
of their common-law duty to protect their children. Id. at 154-55. 
 277. See, e.g., In re Dalton, 424 N.E.2d 1226 (Ill. 1981). 
 278. See Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First 
Amendment Rights of Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 604 
(1998). 
 279. See Kasinsky, supra note 207, at 100-01, 120.  Mothers throughout the 
history of the court system were accused of being bad mothers because it is their 
responsibility to raise orderly and healthy children.  Id. at 98. 
48
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/8
6BROWN_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:54:01 AM 
2005] WHEN THE BOUGH BREAKS: TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS 237 
that hold a battered mother accountable for her partner’s abuse.280 
VII.     TRAUMATIC PARALYSIS 
A. Background 
To raise the defense of duress, defense counsel must 
countermand the societal presumption that the mother is the 
principal caretaker and protector of her child.  If defense counsel 
fails to countermand this presumption, then the criminal justice 
administration and child protection services will conclude that the 
mother failed in her duty.281  Such failure is a punishable crime.282  
The legal community expects mothers to be the barrier against 
abuse to their children whether the abuse is known or unknown by 
the mother.283  When the abuse leads to the death of a child, a 
severe legal assault is promulgated against the mother.284 
Traumatic paralysis is a polemical affirmative defense to 
counter-criminal prosecution of battered mothers.  Traumatic 
paralysis should be utilized in the most extreme cases: mothers who 
are charged as co-defendants in the murder of their children and 
mothers charged with felony child neglect or failure to protect in 
severe cases of child abuse and child homicide.  Courts are least 
sympathetic to these battered mothers. 
Sarah Snodie represents one of the most severe cases.  The 
district attorney aggressively prosecuted the case and the court 
found her culpable.  Snodie’s defense counsel used battered 
woman syndrome to explain her action and inaction throughout 
her relationship with Donnell McKennie.  The court rejected 
defense counsel’s argument and sentenced Snodie to a ten-year 
prison sentence. 
Snodie was a battered woman.  However, the district attorney 
and the court still did not appreciate why she stayed with a man 
who would eventually kill her child.  Snodie sought to leave the 
relationship,285 but McKennie used Snodie’s children to control her 
 
 280. See Enos, supra note 24, at 240-61 (addressing the false assumptions that 
underpin courts’ application of the “failure to protect” doctrine to battered 
woman). 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 249. 
 283. Id. 
 284. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 587-88. 
 285. Transcript of Sentencing, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 
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behavior.286  McKennie used violence and intimidation to control 
Snodie and her children.  Dutton and Painter detail how batterers 
use physical abuse to maintain power in their relationships.287  
Relationships with children involved suffer a heightened danger.288  
Traumatic bonding does not displace battered woman syndrome 
but seeks to give nuances to the psyche of battered women.289  It 
attempts to answer the question District Attorney Robert Jambois 
asked of Sara Snodie: Why stay with a man who batters your child? 
 
Jan. 21, 1997).  Sarah Snodie testified during one battering incident she grabbed 
her children and prepared to leave but she found herself in a tug-of-war over 
Drake: 
Q.   What did Donnell do when he discovered the spot on the couch 
where Donnell or where Drake, as you put it, peed? 
A.    He started yelling and stomping around the house. He yanked the 
chair out from by the wall looking for whatever, and Drake got into. He 
kept on saying that he [Drake] didn’t know how to leave things alone. 
Q.   Did he touch Drake after discovering that spot on the couch? 
A.   He picked him up and brought him to the bathroom. 
Q.   And what did he do then? 
A.   He was yelling at him saying this is where you use the bathroom. 
Q.   And then what happened? 
A.  He brought him back. He set him down, and I picked him up and 
told him I 
was leaving with Felicia, and I grabbed Felicia. 
Q.   What happened next? 
A.  He grabbed Drake from me. 
Q.   And what did he do when he grabbed Drake from you? 
A.   He took Drake and put him over by the chair, and he told me to put 
Felicia down and get a rag and clean up the mess. 
Q.   Did he put him by the gold chair or did he throw him by the gold 
chair? 
A. He set him down really hard by the gold chair. 
Q.   What happened next then? 
A.  I looked at Drake and I told Donnell I was only playing, that I wasn’t 
leaving the house and he told me to get a rag and wipe up the mess 
Drake made. 
Drake later had a seizure after being hit in the head numerous times by 
McKennie. Id. 
 286. See Belknap, supra note 126, at 392.  Belknap noted that women 
experienced a conflict between “feeling love and feeling sorry for the abuser and 
the realization that life with him was harmful to the self, others or both.”  Id. 
 287. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 107. 
 288. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTARY 
HOMICIDE REPORTS (1976-2000). 
 289. Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 105.  No one theory can be 
dispositive as to why battered women risk their lives and the lives of their children 
by staying in abusive relationships.  See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 126, at 388.  An 
amalgam of theories is best suited to answer such a provocative question.  Id. at 
401-03. 
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The key element to launching a traumatic paralysis defense is 
the emotional bond the battered woman has with her abuser that 
leaves her incapable of protecting herself or her children.290  The 
strategies that a battered mother utilizes for the protection of 
herself and her children cannot match the violence perpetrated by 
the abusive partner/father. Battered women do not lack agency, 
but are limited by their circumstances to fully undertake the means 
necessary to operate as society expects.291  The McKennie criminal 
complaint detailed how Snodie used her sexuality to distract 
McKennie from further harming Drake but to no avail.292  He 
would interrupt sexual intercourse to abuse Drake.  The attempt to 
distract McKennie was not accepted by the court or the district 
attorney.  Snodie’s strategies of placating McKennie did not save 
her child’s life.  The State prosecutes mothers who seek to protect 
their children in unconventional or unacceptable ways.293 
The duress defense generally counters crimes of commission.  
Traumatic paralysis can be used to counter the crimes of omission 
against mothers who are not able to protect their children.  
Battered women operate under the constant threat of death or 
bodily harm.294  The woman has obviously been abused in the past; 
thus, she takes the threats from her batterer quite seriously.295  The 
threats are always imminent in nature.296  Snodie’s testimony 
portrayed a woman living in constant fear.297  Her child suffered 
abuse that was immediate and brutal in nature.  Battered women 
also believe that they have no reasonable escape from the abuse.298  
Studies note the most dangerous phase of a battering relationship 
 
 290. See Appel, supra note 169, at 979. 
 291. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 602-03 (stating that the law views battered 
women as able to save their children, not realizing the complexity of the 
victim/agent dichotomy); see also Elaine Chiu, Confronting Agency in Battered 
Mothers, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1223 (2001) (focusing on how the laws regard the 
choices by battered women differently). 
 292. See Criminal Complaint at 4, State v. McKennie, No. 97CF0047 (Wis. Dist. 
Ct. Jan. 21, 1997). 
 293. See supra Part VI.A. (describing the details of the Nicholson case where 
mothers did not leave abusive relationships and the court holding the mothers 
criminally liable). 
 294. See WALKER, supra note 42, at 75. 
 295. Id. 
 296. See Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 106. 
 297. See Transcript of Sentencing, State v. Snodie, No. 97CF0046 (Wis. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 21, 1997). 
 298. See Dutton & Painter, supra note 123, at 109-10. 
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is when the battered woman attempts to leave.299  The court does 
hold the battered mother culpable for exposing her children to 
violence, but does not recognize her strategies while in the 
relationship.300 
B. Practical Application 
Traumatic paralysis can be used to bolster expert testimony as 
to the motives and understanding of the battered mother.  The 
process of explaining learned helplessness and traumatic bonding 
will give the trier of fact a greater understanding of why a mother 
would risk harm to herself or her child by staying in a potentially 
deadly relationship.301 Traumatic paralysis can overcome the 
societal hubris that demands self-sacrificing mothers.302  It explains 
the complexity of the trauma battered mothers face and the 
choices they must make on a daily basis for survival needs.303 
A jury instruction detailing traumatic bonding would allow 
judges and juries to step into the mind of women like Sarah 
Snodie.304  When a battered mother uses duress as a defense, an 
instruction should be allowed to mitigate her intent or reckless 
behavior of the battered mother.  The instruction would merge 
duress and the crime of omission with elements of traumatic 
paralysis: 
(1) the defendant was compelled not to act by the use, or 
threatened use, of unlawful force by the coercer upon the 
defendant; 
(2) the defendant, a person suffering from traumatic 
bonding in her situation, would have been unable to resist 
the coercion; 
(3) the defendant, operating as a reasonable person in 
her situation, was unable to protect herself or others 
because of the unlawful force. 
 
 299. See Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence 
Cases: An Empirical Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX J. WOMEN & L. 
163, 187 (1993). 
 300. See infra Part VII. (highlighting the policy of punishing battered mothers 
who stay in abusive relationships; courts either criminally charge the mothers or 
terminate their parental rights). 
 301. See Cohen, supra note 71, at 763-64. 
 302. See Jacobs, supra note 17, at 655-56. 
 303. See Miccio, supra note 17, at 93. 
 304. See, e.g., CAL. CRIM. JURY INST. 5.17 (2005) (giving instructions with regard 
to an actual, albeit unreasonable, belief with regard to justifiable homicide). 
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The instruction seeks to outline how acts of omission are 
criminal but explainable because of traumatic paralysis.  The 
instruction is not seeking outright exoneration of battered 
mothers, but rather seeks a greater explanation as to why such 
tragic circumstances exist. 
VIII.       CONCLUSION 
If it keeps on rainin’, levee’s goin’ to break 
And the water gonna come in, have no place to stay 
Well all last night I sat on the levee and moan 
Thinkin’ ‘bout my baby and my happy home 
If it keeps on rainin’, levee’s goin’ to break 
And all these people have no place to stay 
Now look here mama what am I to do 
I ain’t got nobody to tell my troubles to305 
 
The paradigm of punishing battered mothers for the death of 
their own children places abused families in competing positions 
for protection and safety.  If the mother is the last line of 
protection for abused children, who protects the mother?  The 
tactics a battered mother uses to protect her child, she must also 
use to protect herself.  When the levee breaks, when the battered 
mother’s strategies no longer placates the batterer, the mothers 
risks criminal prosecution and termination of her parental rights 
for not sufficiently protecting her child. 
Sarah Snodie used tactics that did not save her child’s life.  
Sarah Snodie typifies the dilemma many battered mothers face.  
The emotional bonds that keep battered mothers in abusive 
relationships coalesce with the maternal bonds that protect their 
children from the violence.  Traumatic bonding can answer the 
perpetual question of why many battered mothers stay in abusive 
relationships.  The power imbalance of violent relationships creates 
an abused woman who is incapable of making life-altering or life-
threatening decisions without considering the consequences from 
her violent partner.  The decision to stay in a violent relationship 
eventually makes the battered mother a target for prosecution and 
parental rights termination. 
 
 305. KANSAS JOE MCCOY, WHEN THE LEVEE BREAKS (1929). 
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Traumatic paralysis is not a defense for every abused woman.  
A prima facie requirement would provide courts guidance as to 
what constitutes a battered mother.  The defense was designed for 
women who did not participate in the child abuse but are charged 
as co-actors.  To assert a claim of traumatic paralysis three 
components should be present: (1) a history of abuse in the 
relationship, (2) the woman who is emotionally bound to her 
abusive partner, and (3) the emotional bonding must render the 
abused woman unable to protect herself or others because of the 
persistent abuse.  The abused woman may assert some actions or 
strategies she participated in to protect herself and her children 
that were unsuccessful. 
Society must make it easier for battered women to leave violent 
relationships.  If a battered mother seeks assistance, she knows she 
risks the child welfare system removing her children.  The children 
are rescued, but the battered mother must return to a violent 
household.  The battered mother bides her time waiting to execute 
an egress that may never come—risking her life, the lives of her 
children, her liberty, and her parental rights.  Traumatic paralysis 
can be used to defend battered mothers’ tough choices. 
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